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ABSTRACT
NATIONAL IDENTITY, CITIZENSHIP AND PLURALISM IN TURKEY:
THE TURBAN QUESTION
Funda Gen^oglu
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
August 1997
The contemporary process of globalization involves a tension between cultural 
helerogenization and cultural homogenization which has made the relationship between the 
nation-state and its members a problematical issue. It is out of this context that the modern , 
liberal-democratic notion of citizenship has become focus of attention for the students of 
political science. The modern, liberal-democratic idea of citizenship is based upon a 
distinction between public and private which embraces the principle of equality before the 
law in the public while relegating all particularities and differences to the private. This thesis 
tries to explain the “turban question” in Turkey by contextualizing it with reference to the 
points raised by the contemporary critics of modern, liberal-democratic conception of 
citizenship.
ÖZET
TÜRKİYE’DE KİMLİK, VATANDAŞLIK, VE ÇOĞULCULUK:
TÜRBAN SORUNU
Funda Gençoğlu
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Ağustos 1997
Bu çalışma Türkiye’deki türban sorununu küreselleşme ve buna bağlı olarak farklı kimliklerin 
ortaya çıkışı üzerine siyaset bilimi literatüründe süregiden tartışmalar ışığında açıklamaya 
çalışmaktadır. Tartışmanın ana eksenini modem vatandaşlık anlayışı ve onun eleştirileri 
oluşturmaktadır. Bu teorik çerçeveyle birlikte Türkiye’de vatandaşlık kavramının tarihsel 
gelişimi de verilerek türban meselesinin arkaplanı açıklanmaya çalışılmaktadır.
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For a decade or so, one of the most topical subjects in the political science 
literatuie has been the question of the relationship between the nation-state, 
identity and difference. The debates revolving aiound such concepts as 
'multiculturalism', 'pluralism', 'identity politics', 'politics of difference', 'politics of 
recognition', despite differences among them, have at their center a challenge to 
the foundation of the nation-state. The increasing interest in the relationship 
between the nation-state, identity, and difference has in turn drew the attentions to 
the notion of citizenship, because citizenship is the reference point when at stake is 
the relationship between the modem sate and its members.
One tends to ask what has been responsible for all these developments. 
Bryan Turner points out several factors; Contemporary developments in Eastern 
Europe, and in the Soviet Union which have raised the complicated relationship 
between nationalism, political identity, participation, and citizenship; the refugee 
problem which has created a new crisis of stateless persons in the contemporary 
political system; the institutional growth of the European Community which have 
raised important problems about citizenship status, not only for minorities but also 
for all forms of transient and migrant labor .*
What all these developments tell us is that "citizenship as an issue has 
become prominent, because the traditional boundaries of the nation-state in Europe 
and elsewhere have been profoundly challenged by global developments in the
organization of modem societies. Thus, the first major issue in the revival of 
citizenship as a concept and as a political platform is the process we may call 
globalization."" The centrality of the notion of citizenship in a variety of studies 
has made it clear that citizenship is a problematic concept. As many scholars point 
out, the process of globalization has been going hand in hand with the tension 
between cultural homogenization and the cultural heterogenization which is also 
known as the tension between universalism and particularism.^
On the issue of cultural homogenization, we come across arguments like 
Francis Fukuyama's "the end of history thesis" which sees a universalization of 
liberal democracy, together with the globalization of free market ideology and the 
dissolution of differences into sameness. Concomitantly, one observes 
particularistic conflicts, most prominent examples of which are the rise of religious 
fundamentalism, and of ethnic nationalisms (even "ethnic cleansings"). Apart from 
such political practices, political theory literature too, has been dominated by the 
debates over such issues as multiculturalism, the politics of recognition, and the 
politics of difference.
All these political developments and theoretical debates draw our attention 
to the tendency towards cultural heterogenization rather than cultural 
homogenization. As Robertson argues, globalization involves and promotes the
'Bryan Turner, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship", in B. Turner ed. 
Cidzenship and Social Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1993),!.
^Ibid, p.l.
^Robertson quoted in Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and 
Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Tuikey", New 
Perspectives on Turkey, Fall 1995, No. 13, 100.
relativization of societal and civilizational identities. "As certain general
conceptions of the state-run society and the modem individual have been globally
generalized, so those very developments have facilitated ... the search for
particularistic identities (both collective and individual)"
As Keyman rightly points out, to conceive the process of globalization as a
tension between the universal and the particular, or between sameness and
difference, is not to celebrate the end of history but
to come fully to terms with the fact that the dominant forms of the unitary 
conception of the modem self (as a political class identity or a citizen 
identity or a natural identity) can no longer play their unifying function; 
nor are they capable of dissolving difference into sameness. In other words, 
claims about globalization become meaningful only when they are 
embedded in ... the recognition of 'the crisis of identity'...^
Most democracies are now a mosaic of different ethnic and cultural groups.
Under these circumstances, liberal democratic societies find themselves confronted
with "problems that are associated with equality in the context of difference."* 
Anne Phillips in this context asks very important questions: "How are democracies
to deal with divisions by gender or ethnicity or religion or race, and the way these
impinge on political equality? What meaning can we give to the political
community when so many groups feel themselves outside it? How can
democracies deliver on equality while accommodating and indeed welcoming
difference?"’ One can argue that globalization and the concomitant tension
■' Ronald Robertson, “Globalization, Politics, Religion” in 77»e Chaitging Face o f Religion, eds. J. 
Beckford and T. Luclonan (London: Sage, 1989), 19.
 ^Keyman, "Global Modernity and Nationalism", 94.
*Anne Phillips, Democracy and Difference, Oxford, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, 2.
fbid, 2.
between universalism and particularism, emergence of 'the crisis of identity and 
the discussions about the question of pluralism and politics of difference have 
made it clear that the meaning of democracy is changing. Today, in the light of a 
new historical situation, we have to confront new questions.
These questions that contemporary democracies face take us to the 
questions of justice, equality and freedom. These issues, in turn, should be 
addressed keeping in mind the crucial question of pluralism in culture, religion, 
morality. The core of the problem of citizenship and pluralism is the cultural 
fragmentation of modem states. Members of these states have different personal 
identities, as evidenced by their ethnic affiliations, their religious beliefs, their 
views of personal morality, their ideas about what is valuable in life, their tastes 
and so forth. In all these areas there is a little possibility of convergence or 
agreement. Yet at the same time, the individuals and groups having these different 
particular identities need to live together politically.
This in turn means that there should be some common ground or reference 
point from which their claims on the state can be judged. Citizenship is supposed 
to provide this reference point*. However, the modem notion of citizenship falls 
short of being useful to deal with the new questions, namely 'the problems that are 
associated with equality in the context of difference.' To put it briefly, the notion 
of citizenship as we undershind the term today is unable to respond to the 
requirements of the principle of pluralism.
David Miller, “Citizenship and PhiraUstn”, Political Studies, No.43, 1995, 432.
It is at this point that liberal democracy and its critiques become crucial, 
since what the term ‘changing definition of democracy in the light of new 
questions’ implies is a specific challenge to liberal democracy. The reason for this 
is that liberal democracy has been the dominant strand within democratic tradition. 
As one scholar points out, positions on democracy has fallen broadly into two 
schools of thought; there have been those who supported liberal democracy and 
those who regarded it as an impoverished and inadequate form.’ In other words, 
the strengths or weaknesses of liberal democracy have provided the central axis of 
debate. More importantly, what the phrase 'citizenship as we understand the term 
today' implies is the formulation of citizenship in liberal political thought and the 
central issue that the critics of liberal democracy have been focusing their 
attention on is the way that that strand in democratic tradition conceptualizes the 
relationship between citizenship and plmalism.
The main reason why liberal democratic notion of citizenship has been 
criticized in this manner is the premise of universality that it is grounded on. 
Universality implies that all individuals are given the same formalAegal rights 
regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, religion or class which results in an abstract 
notion of citizen-individual. The rationale behind this formula is that these latter 
categories are conceptualized/formulated as 'private concerns'. In liberal political 
thought the public sphere and the private sphere are completely separated from 
each other. The realm of politics is defined in the public sphere and so is 
citizenship. Consequently, liberal democratic citizenship has taken the form of a 
legal status where everybody is equal, and the possessor of the same political
Phillips, Democracy and Difference, 3.
rights. The public sphere, so defined, has to be impersonal and also neutral with 
regard to gender, religion, race and ethnicity defined as 'private concerns'.
These two points, that is the abstract notion of citizen-individual and the 
public/private distinction are the two main points that are being raised by a certain 
category of the students of democracy who are critical of the liberal strand in the 
democratic tradition. They claim that the principle of universality in the modem 
category of citizenship has created a homogenous public, because it has relegated 
all particularity and difference to the private^ ®. So they call into question the liberal 
separation of the public and private spheres and urge for a new xmderstanding of 
the nature of these two spheres. These in turn, bring into the picture the question of 
pluralism and consequently a new conception of citizenship.
One common concern in different conceptualizations and/or formulations 
of citizenship is that "from the ancient world to the present day, citizenship has 
entailed a discussion of, and a stmggle over, the meaning and scope of 
membership of the community in which one lives. Who belongs and what does 
belonging mean in practice?"“ This study will address this question within the 
context of Turkish polity.
What we have outlined so far is a global trend in which we have been 
witnessing the 'crisis of identity' with the concomitant tension between the 
universal and the particular which in turn has led to a debate over the problem of
Chantal Mouffe, "Preface: Democratic Politics Today" in C. Mouffe ed. Dimemiom of Radical 
Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, ( London, New York: Verso, 1992), 7.
" S.Hall, and D. Held, "Citizens and Citizenship" in S.Hall and M. Jacques, eds. New Times: The 
Ctuinging Face o f Politics in the 1990s, ( London: LawrenceA Wishart, 1990), 144.
cultural pluralism and citizenship. Turkey is not an exception to this global trend. 
During the last decades in Turkey, like in other parts of the world, demands 
coming from people with different identities have begun to occupy a central place 
in the political agenda. Different groups asserting their imique identities have 
come to the surface. Some examples are the reemergence of the Kiu’dish 
nationalism, and the rise of Islamic identity. As Keyman points out, this political 
landscape in Turkey exemplifies very clearly the tension between the universal and 
the particular. What is at stake is the clash between the secular national identity as 
the bearer of cultural homogenization and the revitalization of the claims of 
difference through these movements*^. The reemergence of the Kurdish 
nationalism and the rise of Islamic identity directly challenge the unifying 
conception of cultural identity which is the premise on which secular republic of 
Turkey has been grounded. This social formation, that is the revitalization of the 
claims of difference as a challenge to monolithic conception of national identity in 
Turkey is what Keyder calls as "the dilemma of cultural identity on the margin of 
Europe"* ,^
A concrete case in which this dilemma has been epitomized is the 'turban 
affair', that is the debate over the women's head covering in Turicey. This affair has 
been on the agenda since the beginning of the 1980s. During the last few years, 
however, it has become a source of polarization in the political life of Turkey. 
What triggered this political problem was the demands coming from some
Keyman, "Global Modernity and Nationalism", 94-95.
Çağlar Keyder, “The Dilemma of Cultural Identity on the Margin of Europe”, Review No. 16, 
1993, 19-33.
university students to attend the classes with their heads covered, in accordance 
with the Islamic precepts. Later on, a category of the professional women 
(especially doctors and lawyers) also began to raise their demands to be able to 
perform their jobs with that particular dressing style. However, these demands 
were not found acceptable by the authorities on the grounds that they were against 
the Dress Code. The women who politicized this issue put forward their major 
demands in the context of identity politics. At the same time, they have been 
claiming that the ban on turban is a violation of individual rights and freedoms. On 
the other hand, those against these demands have been claiming that such demands 
constitute a threat to the basic principle of Kemalist regime which is laicism.
Indeed, the debates over the women's head-dress is part of the process of 
the political revitalization of Islam in Turkey. Consequently, the way in which the 
events and discussions around the turban affair was articulated has led to an 
opposition between seculars and the religiously oriented; or between Kemalists and 
Islamists. In time, this opposition has become increasingly polarized due to the 
particular way in which the Turkish national identity, and relatedly, the notion of 
citizenship, have been defined in Turkey. More specifically, the two intertwined- 
principles of the Kemalist republic, namely nationalism and laicism play an 
important role in the conceptualization of citizenship in the Turkish polity, and 
contribute to the political polarization on the turban question.
The main objective of this study is to try to explain the turban affair in 
Turkey by contextualizing it with reference to the two interrelated points raised by 
the contemporary critics of the modern, liberal democratic conception of
citizenship. One is the aforementioned public/private distinction in the liberal 
thought, and the other is the abstract notion of citizen-individual. It will be argued 
that these two points can be quite useful as analytical tools in our task of trying to 
explain the debates over the turbaned women in Turkey.
In the first chapter there will be an examination of the main principles that 
the modem notion of citizenship is grounded on. An integral element of this 
analysis is to situate the notion of modern citizenship in the context of critical 
approaches to liberal democracy.
The second chapter will be an overview of the controversy over the 
turbaned women (students and professionals) in Turkey. The arguments put 
forward by different groups, like media, politicians, intelligence, and the degree of 
polarization between the ‘seculars’ and the ‘religiously oriented’ will be analyzed 
in light of the historical background of the state/ religion relationship.
In the third chapter, we will examine the question of how we can 
understand the main political dimensions of the turban affair in Turkey by using as 
analytical tools the two main points raised by the contemporary critics of modem 
citizenship.
CHAPTER 1
THE MODERN NOTION OF CITIZENSHIP AND ITS
CRITIQUE
I) Liberal Democratic Conception o f Citizenship
Although the historical roots of the notion of citizenship go back to the 
ancient times (to the city-states in ancient Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries 
B.C. and of Romans from the third century B.C. to the first A.D.), citizenship, as 
we understand the term today, is a modem concept. Its evolution went hand in 
hand with the development of the liberal democratic tradition during the French 
Revolution. This chapter will outline the major principles that the modem notion 
of citizenship is grounded on from an historical perspective. In light of this 
information, we will be able to make an analysis of the critical approaches to this 
formulation of citizenship.
Liberal-individualist tradition has its origins in the French Revolutionary 
ideas. Its evolution went hand in hand with the spread of nationalism at the end of 
the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. This period also 
witnessed the emergence of nation-states. Although different versions of 
nationalism gave rise to different conceptions of citizenship, modem citizenship 
was formulated within the liberal framework and therefore, it had the same 
connotations in those parts of the world where we see the emergence of nation­
states and the concomitant dominance of liberal ideas. The reason why the
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development of the nation-state went hand in hand with that of liberal democracy 
is that during the French Revolution and thereafter nationalism developed together 
with the idea of popular sovereignty- the ideology that challenged the basis of the 
ancien régime. The roots of nationalism lie in the eighteenth-century liberal idea 
that human beings possessed sufficient rationality to acknowledge the rights of 
others and make sensible collective decisions*'*.
During the second half of the eighteenth century demands for freedom
fi-om religious discrimination, for equality before the law, for freedom fi'om
arbitrary arrest, and for the extension of political rights to a wider spectrum of
society were voiced**and as Jay points out,
those who advocated political rights... necessarily had to weld together 
popular alliances that cut across existing political and social divisions to 
counterbalance the power of their rulers. A vital part of this was defining a 
wider identity into which different social classes, ethnic groups, tribes, and 
religious congregations could be grouped. This was the nation**.
This situation has a direct influence on the evolution of the notion of
modem citizenship. It meant that there was a need for uniformity, homogeneity
among the people; and the modem notion of citizenship was developed to fulfil
this need. As Koker puts it:
Richard Jay, "Nationalism" in R.EccIeshaU et al. (eds.) Political Ideologies: An Introduction 
(London: Hutchinson, 1986), 187.
David Heater, Citizensfüp:The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education, (London, 
New York: Longman, 1990), 37-3%.
Ibid., 190.
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French Revolution invented the modem national citizenship in a 
democratic revolution and established a new polity based on the principle 
of equality before the law. This legalistic egalitarianism was fortified by a 
new law grounded on the concept of a nation une el indivisible and, in turn, 
required the inculcation of the same values in all men and women.
Koker refers to a core idea of the modem idea of citizenship: equality 
before the law. As the following analysis is going to show, it is a notion which has 
its roots in liberal political philosophy and which in turn takes us to the core of 
liberal citizenship.
The principle of equality before the law came with the notion of popular 
sovereignty during the French Revolution. The main target was social hierarchies 
which used to be the basis of honor in the ancien régime sense in which it is 
intrinsically linked to inequalities'*. As against this notion of honor, we have the 
modem notion of ‘dignity’ in the French revolutionary ideas, now used in a 
universalist and egalitarian sense, where we talk of the inherent "dignity of human 
beings", or of citizen dignity” . The underlying premise here is that everyone 
shares this human dignity as citizens.
The reformers adduced various arguments to justify these demands, but the 
‘natural rights’ theory of John Locke remained cmcial in the definition of 
citizenship. The liberal tradition defines citizenship in terms of individual rights 
which is founded on the premise of the inherent "dignity of human beings". Locke
” Lèvent Kôker, "Political Toleration or Politics of Recognition: The Headscarves Affair 
Revisited", Political Theory, Vol.24No.2, May 1996, 317.
Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Poldcs o f Recognition ( Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 27.
” Ibid.
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held that “reason is the common rule and measure that God has given to mankind” 
and therefore that all men must be considered created equal and thereby worthy of 
the same dignity and respect. According to the natural rights theory of John Locke 
in particular, and the liberal tradition in general, man has natural rights which are 
prior to government. Man is by nature free, and no men can have authority over 
another except with his consent. There is the notion that human beings are 
atomistic, rational agents whose existence and interests are ontologically prior to 
society and who have intrinsic worth"®. If human beings are thought of first and 
foremost, as individuals, they must be entitled to the same rights and the same 
respect. As was said before -with regard to the difference between honor and 
dignity- modem liberal political theory arose as a response to any rejection of life 
that is built upon the recognition and enforcement of unequal statuses and powers - 
in short domination based on differences. Consequently, the claim of equality 
which is so central in modem liberal political thought is groimded in a rejection of 
‘natural’ authority based on difference and on the assertion of the existence of a 
fundamental human sameness, that is possession of the same bundle of natural 
rights or of reason. Universality in this sense is what liberal democracy is 
grounded on. All individuals are endowed with equal rights that they enjoy by 
virtue of being human. This is the essence of the natural rights theory of John 
Locke. A natural consequence of this is a particular conception of equality at the 
heart of which lie a rejection of social privileges or advantages which are enjoyed 
by some but denied to others on the basis of factors like gender, race, religion or
Mary Dietz, "Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship" in C.Mouffe ed. 
Dimemiom of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenslup, Community, 64.
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social background. Hence the equality to which liberals subscribe is equality 
before the law. Notwithstanding any social differences of wealth or status, 
notwithstanding any biological differences of ability or strength, as citizens we 
should be treated the same. Whatever the differences, they do not matter. They 
should not be allowed to count.
This legalistic egalitarianism takes the form of what theorists call ‘negative 
freedom’ which is a second tenet of the modem notion of citizenship. Liberal 
political thought asserts that society should ensure the freedom of all its members 
to realize their capabilities. Liberalism has its particular conception of freedom 
which helps to distinguish it from other political tendencies. As Arblaster points 
out, to speak of freedom immediately invites at least three questions. Freedom 
from what? To do what? And for whom? The liberal definition is normally 
couched in terms of ‘freedom from’ rather than ‘freedom to’: “It usually defines 
freedom negatively, as a condition in which one is not compelled, not restricted, 
not interfered with, and not pressurized.” *^ John Stuart Mill's observation is a 
classic formulation of this principle: "The only freedom which deserves the name, 
is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to 
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it"“" Similarly, Isaiah 
Berlin states that
■' A. Arblaster, The Rise and Decline o f Western Liberalism, 1984, 56. 
”  Quoted in Dietz, “Context”, 64.
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I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of 
men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the 
area within which a man can act imobstructed by others. If I am prevented 
by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree 
unfree“
This particular conception of individual freedom, which is defrned as the 
freedom of the individual to choose his own values or ends without interference 
from others or, simply, absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities, is 
closely associated with the particular conception of human equality in liberal 
tradition. It is man's right, Locke tells us, merely because he is a man, to be 
allowed to make the best of his life according to his own notion of what is good. 
Government has nothing better to do than to help him achieve his end, not by 
giving him what he wants, but making it possible for him to get it by his own 
efforts"“  In that respect, that is having those rights vis-a-vis the state all 
individuals are equal.
In sum, then, we can say that the notions of the inherent dignity of human 
beings, of equality before the law, and of negative liberty, are the building blocks 
of liberal democratic citizenship which is "the conception of the individual as the 
'bearer of formal rights' designed to protect him from the interference of others and 
to guarantee him the same opportimities or 'equal access' as others"^’.
An inseparable part of this formula is liberalism’s separation of the public 
and the private spheres. This distinction consists briefly of the principle of the state
Quoted in Arblaster, Liberalism, 57.
John Plamenatz, Man and Society (London: Longman, 1963), 251. 
Dietz, “Context”, 65.
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neutrality with reference to certain social spheres and practices which typically 
include religion, lifestyles, conceptions of the good, and cultural preferences and 
which are defined as private. State neutrality implies that whereas political 
authority should leave the citizens fi"ee with reference to the many different 
conceptions of the good within the private realm, they should in the public sphere 
be neutral, blind, and indifferent to differences in order to treat everyone equally. 
In this framework citizenship is defined in the public sphere where all individuals 
bear of the same formal/legal rights: right to vote, right to stand for election and 
equality of access. In the public sphere, everyone participates as a member of a 
polity, and as such he or she is just a citizen like everybody else. In the public 
sphere citizens should disregard their individual and particular memberships and 
be ‘just citizens’ on an equal basis. Such differences as gender, race, ethnicity, 
class or religion which are the constitutive elements of one’s identity, are 
formulated as private concerns against which the public sphere has to remain 
neutral.
As we said above, liberal democracy has presumed that we can abstract 
some essential human sameness in people. Universality in this sense is what liberal 
democracy is grounded on. The goal of the state is indeed to fi-ee people fi'om their 
differences in the public domain and to equalize all members in their political 
capacity, independently fi'om the particular hmnan beings they are. It would be an 
error to view this political goal as narrow-mindedness. It has been fundamentally 
important in modem history, supporting the emancipation process fi'om 
hierarchical societies to liberal democracy. However, in today’s political context, it
16
fails to recognize the nature of the demands for the public recognition of collective
identities.
At its best, universal citizenship is what every oppressed group has 
appealed to over the last 200 years: ‘No, it does not matter that I am 
a woman, or an African or a Jew..., for what matters is that we are 
all human beings’. At its worst, however, it suffers from what 
generations of socialists have pointed out in relation to class: it 
denies what are very real (social) differences that will prevent us 
from being treated the same?^
So, this universality of the modem citizenship has been both an 
achievement, a contribution to political equality, and at the same time, it has been 
the bases of its limitations. Consequently, this principle of universality has been 
the main focus of attention for the critics of liberal democracy.
2) Critique o f Liberal Democratic Citizenship
The critics of liberal democracy claim that it is dangerous to pretend that 
who or what we are is irrelevant and to ask people to submerge their group 
differences in an abstract citizenship. This leaves the existing power relations 
intact which in turn will reproduce existing inequalities in the society. So, the 
major criticism of liberal democracy focuses on its failure to deliver on the 
promise of political equality. Liberal democracy lends to regard this as adequately 
met by the equal rights to vote and to stand for election; and in doing so, it 
neglects the social and economic conditions that would make this equality 
ineffective.
Anne Phillips, Engendering Democracy (Oxford, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 53-54, 
emphasis added.
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Amy Gutmann for instance asks: “Can citizens with diverse identities be 
represented as equals if public institutions do not recognize our particular identities 
but only oiu more universally shared interests? Apart from ceding each of us the 
same rights as all other citizens, what does respecting people as equals entail? In 
what sense should our identities as men or women,... Christian, Jews, Muslims... 
publicly matter?”^^ .
According to the liberal view of the neutrality of the public sphere our 
freedom and equality as citizens refer only to our common characteristics, our 
universal needs regardless of our particular race, religion, ethnicity, or gender. It 
suggests that the impersonality of public institutions is the price that the citizens 
should be willing to pay for living in a society that treats us all as equals“*.
In a parallel line of thinking with Gutmann, Charles Taylor too, calls into 
question this liberal notion of the neutrality or impersonality of the public sphere. 
In his Multiculturalism and the Politics o f Recognition (1992) he argues that 
public institutions should not simply refuse to respond to the demand for 
recognition by citizens“’. The demand to be publicly recognized for one’s 
particularity is as understandable as it is problematic and controversial.
Then, the crucial question arises: "flow can the maximiun of pluralism can 
be defended -in order to respect the rights of the widest possible groups- without 
destroying the very framework of the political community as constituted by the
Amy Gutmann, "Introduction" in C. Taylor, Multiculturalism arid the Politics o f Recognition 




institutions and practices that constitute modem democracy and define our identity 
as citizens?"*®.
Liberal democratic citizenship rans into difficulties when it is faced with 
the challenge of plurali»n. This clash between citizenship and pluralism is veiy 
difficult to solve and it is the main foeus of the critics of the liberal notion of 
citizenship in their effort to understand and explain the main dimensions of this 
problem. They try to do this by drawing the attention to two important points that 
lie at the heart of the liberal democratic conception of citizenship: the 
public/private distinction and the consequent abstract notion of citizen-individual.
The core of the problem of citizenship and pluralism is the cultural 
fi'agmentation of modem states. Members of these states have different identities; 
their ethnic affiliations, their religious beliefs, their views of 'good life' are 
different. Yet at the same time, these individuals and groups with different 
particular identities have to live together. As noted, liberal democratic tradition 
deals with this issue through a separation of the public and the private spheres. 
What was referred as different or fi-agmented personal identities are formulated as 
private coneems against which the public sphere has to remain neutral. Those 
particularities and differences of our personal lives and commitments do not have 
any political significance, they belong to the private sphere. As can be observed, 
the realm of politics is defined in the public sphere; and the so-called private 
concerns are dismissed fi-om the realm of the politics.
Mouffe, “Democratic Politics Today", 3.
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In liberal democracy the rights that the individuals hold are distinct from 
each other. "Individual rights correspond to the notion of a private realm of 
freedom, separate and distinct from that of the public"^’. These rights pertain to the 
prevention of any interference -by the state , by other individuals or groups- into 
the private sphere. What is included in the private sphere are gender, race, religion, 
ethnicity. Consequently, the public realm is composed of 'citizens' who are 
supposed to leave behind the characteristics that make them different from each 
other. This is a public sphere which is based upon the principles of sameness, 
difference-blindness, and homogeneity and which "relegates all particularity and 
difference to the private realm"“ . This is the situation that Keyman refers to as the 
'colonization of the public sphere'^ .^
What comes out of this debate in tiun is a need for a new conception of 
citizenship that is going to be adequate for the requirements of pluralism; a new 
conception of citizenship whose principles have to be responsive to the demands of 
the plurality of particular identities and to the new political demands posed by
i
globalization. According to the students of democracy who are critical of the 
liberal strand in democratic tradition, the reason why the modem category of 
citizenship falls short of being useful for the requirements of cultural plmalism is 
because it is based on the idea of an abstract universalist defrnition of the public, 
opposed to a domain of the private seen as the realm of particularity and
Dietz, “Context”, 66.
Mouife, “Democratic Politics Today", 9.
33E.Fuat Keyman, "Nasil Bir Liberal Demokrasi", Diyalog, 1/1, 1996, 99.
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difference. They argue that although the modem idea of the citizen was indeed 
cmcial for the development of democracy, today it constitutes an obstacle to its 
extension. The public realm in the liberal democratic conception of citizenship has 
been based upon the exclusion of all particularities and differences. This exclusion 
has been seen as inevitable to postulate the generality and universality of the public 
sphere. The result, of course, has been a homogeneous public and it is within this 
public sphere that citizenship is defined in liberal tradition. This is why, they 
suggest, the public sphere should be revitalized. This task of reviving the public 
sphere in turn requires a broader definition of the realm of politics whose premise 
will be that of "stressing the political nature of what used to be dismissed as 
personal or private concerns. In that way, the public sphere and therefore the 
realm of politics will be opened up to differences, to a maximum pluralism. In 
other words, it will not be excluding the particularities of the different conceptions 
of good life which are to a very great extent shaped by one's identity on gender, 
race, religious beliefs, ethnic affiliations which have traditionally been 
conceptualized as private concerns. Hence, this is the way through which 
articulation between the public and private spheres should take place.
This articulation has very important implications for the relation between 
citizenship and identity. Before taking up these implications, however one thing 
should be made more clear about this new imderstanding of the public and the 
private spheres and the new mode of articulation between them. This new 
understanding challenges and criticizes the conventional public/private distinction.
^ Phillips, Democracy atui Difference, 86.
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but it does not abandon it, instead, it reformulates it. This principle of not 
abandoning but reformulating the public/private distinction has two important 
implications : First, in this new formula no aspect of life can be dismissed from the 
realm of politics by claiming that it is a private concern therefore it is not political. 
"There should be certain aspects of om· lives that we are entitled to treat as private, 
but no aspect that we are compelled to treat in this way"^*. For example, we should 
be free to talk publicly on all sexual issues, and none should be excluded from 
public discussion as inappropriate or better suited to the private domain^®. At the 
same time, we should have the right to keep our sexual lives to ourselves.
Second, due attention should be paid to the difference between the 
articulation between the two spheres in the form of active citizenship on the one 
hand and introducing the specific values of a race, gender, ethnic group or a 
religion into the very definition of citizenship to guide politics on the other. It 
implies that one's citizenship should not solely be dependent on one’s gender, 
ethnic, religious or racial identity. Here we need a distinction between a sphere of 
the public and a sphere of the private. "This is the great contribution of political 
liberalism to modem democracy which guarantees the defense of pluralism and 
the respect of individual freedom."^’
The main objective of this new understanding of the relation between the 
public and the private spheres is the assertion that the individual will not be
Iris Young quoted in Phillips, Democracy and Difference, 85, emphasis added. 
“  Ibid., 85.
’’ Mouffe, “Democratic Politics Today", 11.
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sacrificed to the citizen. Because the second main point raised by the critics of the 
liberal democratic citizenship is the abstract notion of 'citizen-individual'. The 
assertion that the individual is not to be sacrificed to the citizen implies that "the 
plurality of forms of identities through which we are constituted and which 
correspond to om· insertion in a variety of social relations, as well as their tension, 
should be legitimized"^®.
At this point the notion of 'agonism' becomes very important which is the 
principle of acknowledging or recognizing the relationship between identity and 
difference^’. In this context what becomes crucial is the opening up of decision­
making processes to the demands coming from the public sphere, or more 
specifically recognizing the participation of civil societal organizations in these 
decision-making processes in order for the relations between the state and the civil 
society to become more democratic.
On this issue of the state/civil society relations we see a wide gap between 
liberal democratic ideals and their realization. At the theoretical level, liberal 
democracy acknowledges the necessity of representation through political parties 
and of the influence of interests groups on the decision-making processes which 
constitute mechanisms for monitoring of the state fi'om below. However, in 
practice we see that this has not been realized. When we examine the history of the 
existing liberal democracies we see that political participation has decreased to a 
considerable extent, the bonds of representation between political parties and civil
’* Ibid., 5.
”  Keyman, "Nasil Bir Liberal Demokrasi", 101.
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society have been weakened and even have broken down, and the increasing 
bureaucratization of the state apparatus has closed the decision-making processes 
to the demands coming from groups with different identities'*®. The idea of 
political participation has been limited to mean going to the ballot box in every 
foiu· or five years.
At this point, the difference or perhaps the clash between two conceptions 
of freedom, that is, between negative freedom and positive freedom should be 
mentioned. Negative freedom which is a central principle of the liberal political 
thought refers specifically to the absence of any interference by the state or by 
other individuals into one's pmsuit of his/her own goals. It is freedom from. On 
the contrary, positive liberty refers to the need to participate democratically in the 
making and ordering of the polity in which one lives. It is freedom to. The latter 
was the understanding of freedom associated with the notion of citizenship in the 
ancient Greece, the birthplace of citizenship. In classical times citizenship was not 
thought of as a separate activity from the daily lives of the people. It was perceived 
as a means of trying to achieve a better life. Being a good citizen was an integral 
part of any conception of a good life. In other words, citizenship was not just a 
means to being free; it was the way of being free itself. Therefore, Aristotle, to 
whom we owe the earliest thorough discussion of citizenship, declared that the 




In liberal democratic view of citizenship positive freedom is regarded as 
valuable but secondary; the priority is placed on the former type of freedom i.e. 
negative freedom- absence of obstacles in the pursuit of individual interests by the 
atomized, rational 'citizens’. And the critics of liberal democracy reverses this 
order. They propose that the positive view of liberty should be reincorporated into 
the concept of citizenship as had been the case in the ancient Greece.
In sum, then, the critics find the liberal democratic conception of 
citizenship impoverished on the basis that it conceives different 'cultural identities' 
and the conceptions of good life that find expression in these identities as concerns 
belonging not to the public (political) but to the private (personal) realm. Because, 
they claim, while accepting this distinction between the public and the private, 
liberal democracy also accepts that the state should be 'neutral' against these 
particular identities and 'closed' to their political reflections which in turn 
constitute an obstacle for the realization of such core political ideals of democracy 
as pluralism and participation'". The critics of liberal democracy suggest that the 
recognition of the multi-dimensionality of identity and its relation to 'the other' 
contributes to the reconstruction of the public sphere around a dialogue among 
different identities'*".
In the rest of this study we will try to analyze how this critique of the 
modem notion of citizenship can help us imderstand and explain the dimensions of 
the turban question in Turkey. We will try to contextualize this issue with
Levent Köker, "Radical Demokrasi", Diyalog, 1/1, 1996, 114. 
Keyman, "Nasil Bir Liberal Demokrasi", 102.
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reference to such concepts as identity, difference, national identity, and citizenship. 
We will argue that the turban question in Turkey is a case that exemplifies the 
problematical relationship among these concepts.
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT MAKES THE TURBAN QUESTION A ’QUESTION’ IN
TURKEY?
The theoretical propositions outlined above manifest themselves in the 
debate over the women's head covering which became politicized in the last few 
years in Turkey. In this chapter, the turban question will be analyzed within the 
context of the political polarization between secular modernism and Islamic 
traditionalism in Turkey. This polarization is one specific case which exemplifies 
very clearly the tension between cultural homogenization and cultural 
heterogenization. The relationship between this polarity on the one hand and the 
turban affair on the other has to be elaborated carefully in order to understand the 
current debates over the women's head covering in Turkey. This, in turn, requires 
an analysis of the Turkish modernization which started early in the nineteenth 
century.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, concerns regarding the disintegration 
of the Ottoman Empire led to the formulation of various projects by the Ottoman 
state persons who hoped to reverse what seemed to be an inevitable process. One 
of these projects -modernization- became the dominant discourse. The objective of 
modernization was to put an end to the decline of the Ottoman Empire and to bring 
it to the level of the contemporary western civilization. Consequently, some 
reforms began to be undertaken with Sultan Abdulmecit's promulgation of the
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Tanzimat Charter in 1839 in the fields of administration, legislation, and 
education. The reforms embraced various liberal principles such as the equality of 
people of all religions before the law. In the early republican years, the will to 
modernization acquired increased momentum. The Kemalist intelligentsia took a 
sharper turn towards modernization in order to bring Turkey to the level of 
contemporary Western civilization. In 1922 the Caliphate, Islamic schools. Şeriat 
courts and the ministries of Şeriat and Evkaf (Pious foundations) were abolished. 
In 1925 sects and orders were banned and monasteries were closed. In the same 
two years a unified educational system under a secular Ministry of Public 
Instruction was established and also a Directorate of Religious Affairs was 
established. 1925 all male Turks were compelled to abandon the fez and wear in its 
place a hat thereby ending social and religious distinctions which had been obvious 
fi-om a person's headgear. In 1926 the Gregorian calendar was put into effect. 
Again in 1926, to replace Şeriat the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Penal Code and a 
commercial code based largely on the German and the Italian commercial codes 
were adapted. In 1928, the clause referring to Islam as the religion of the Turkish 
state was removed from the constitution. As Feroz Ahmad observes, the most 
iconoclastic reform of this period was to replace the Arabic script by the Latin 
script; "At a stroke, even the literate people were cut off from their past. 
Overnight, virtually the entire nation was made illiterate"'*’ . The aim of all these 
changes was to diminish the influence of Muslim culture and weaken the power of
Feroz Ahmad, The Making o f Modem Turkey, (London, New York: Routledge, 1993), 80.
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tradition. By placing legislation, education, and the judicial system under secular 
control religion was tried to be kept out of the public life.
The reforms initiated by both the Ottoman and the Republican elites 
dramatically influenced the existing cultural practices. The modernizing elites in 
the Ottoman-Turkish polity were influenced by what Edward Said has referred as 
Orientalism, the manufactured western image of the Muslim world. Said has 
defined Orientalism as "an enormously systematic discipline by which European 
culture was able to manage -and even produce- the Orient politically, 
sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the 
post-Enlightenment period"'” . He has argued that limitations were imposed by 
Orientalism on thought and action. He has explained this relationship between the 
Orient and the Occident by using the concept of 'hegemony' in the Gramscian 
sense“*’ which refers to cultural leadership and its salience. As a consequence of 
this cultural hegemony in the Western world we see the development of a 
collective notion of identifying 'us' Westerners as against all non-Westemers and 
also a feeling of superiority in comparison with all the non-Western peoples and 
cultures'” . In addition to this, there is also the hegemony of European ideas about 
the Orient "reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness usually *
** Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 3.
‘'^Gramsci makes a distinction between civil and political society in which the former is made up 
of voluntary associations like schools and families; and the latter of state institutions (the army, 
the police) whose function is direct domination. Culture operates within civil society where the 
influence of ideas work not through domination but consent. In any society nontotalitarian then 
certain cultural forms predominate over others Just as certain ideas are more influential than 
others. The form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has called hegemony. (Said, 
Orientalism, 7).
■'^ Said, Orientalism, 7.
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overriding the possibility that a more independent or more skeptical thinker might 
have different views on the matter""*’.
Hence, while the West was taking the leadership of modernity through the 
ideas of Enlightenment and industrialization, Eastern societies with a time lag, 
began to emulate the Western model·**. This development went hand in hand with a 
process of internalization of Orientalism on the part of the Orient itself which in 
turn led to the conclusion that it was their 'inferior' culture that should have been 
blamed for their backwardness vis-a-vis the West. They found themselves in a 
situation in which they had to measure the backwardness of their nation in terms of 
certain imiversal standards set by the advanced nations of Europe. They 
consequently believed that their inherited cultures did not enable them to reach 
those standards set by the advanced nations in question and that there was a need 
to re-equip themselves cultmally, that is to transform themselves*’.
As Kadioglu points out. Orientalism is deeply ingrained within the 
literature that endeavors to shed some light on the internal causes of 
underdevelopment in Third World societies.^® This literature constitute the 
modernization perspective which has its roots in the works of such scholars as 
Ferdinand Toennies, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. In explaining the origins
Ibid.
'*'* Nilüfer Göle, Modem Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Örtünme (İstanbul, Metis Yayınlan, 1991), 13.
Paıtha Chatteıjee, Nationalist Thought atui the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse 
(Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 4.
Ayşe Kadıoğlu, "Women's Subordination in Tuikey: Is Islam Really the Villain?", Middle East 
Journal, Volume 48, No.4, Autumn 1994, 649.
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of the modernization process these scholars developed the ideal construction of 
two polar types of societies: traditional and modem.’* This framework has been 
used to defrne modernization as a transition from the former to the latter.’" The 
basic assumption of this perspective is that the preponderance of traditional 
features, internal value systems, and institutions constitute both an expression and 
a cause of underdevelopment that prevent modernization” . Modem is defrned by 
studying Western societies and the traditional is defrned not only in terms of a 
relationship of economic hierarchy and dependence, but also through references to 
the Islamic nature of some of these traditional societies” .
The modernization perspective became the dominant discourse among the 
reforming elites of the Ottoman-Tinkish polity. Indeed, they were native 
orientalists who were perceiving Islam as a hindrance to development. The reforms 
undertaken by these elites created a cleavage between western looking bureaucratic 
elite and the relatively illiterate popular classes whose way of life was being 
threatened by the new mode of social regulation imposed upon them. The latter 
took refuge in Islamic precepts arguing that the decline experienced by the 
Ottoman Empire was caused by the values of the West and the abandonment of the 
Islamic way of life. Native Orientalists, on the other hand, were pointing to the 
inferiority of the Muslim tradition. The reforms that began to be undertaken with
^'Toennies has distinguished between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, and Dürkheim has 
distinguished between mechanical and organic solidarity, as characteristics of simple and 
complex societies respectively. Also see Kadioglu, “Women’s Subordination”, 649.
”  Ibid., 656.
J.S.Valenzuela, & A.Valenzuela, "Modernization and Dependency" in R. Macridis and B. 
Brown eds. Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, (The Dorsey Press, 1986), 99.
^Kadioglu, “Women’s Subordination”, 650.
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the Tanzimat charter were, first traits of the project of replacing a Muslim way of 
life with a Western way of life. The debate regarding this process was about how 
to achieve a balance between the materiality of the West and the spirituality of the 
Hast. As a result of these cleavages between the leading intellectuals of the time, 
the main concern was to set limitations to the process of modernization and 
westernization. The main problématique of the writers between the Tanzimat and 
the Republic was the achievement of a balance between these reforms and Islamic 
teachings by delineating the possibility of a compatibility between the two^*. Some 
leading intellectuals of the time like Abdullah Cevdet, Tevfik Fikret, Şemsettin 
Sami were viewing the European or Western civilization as an indivisible force, 
and maintained that development was not only a matter of technological advance 
but also of adopting the western way of thinking and behaving. Consequently, they 
adopted certain Western codes of conduct and consumption patterns. A second 
group of writers of that period like Mahmut Esat, Ahmet Mithad, and Namık 
Kemal, while believing in the importance of and even necessity of civilization, 
were distinguishing between the good and the bad aspects of the Western 
civilization while the former corresponded to its material and the latter to its 
spiritual aspects. According to this point of view nothing should be borrowed fi'om 
the spiritual aspects of the Western European civilization, only the science and 
technology should be imported. Hence, the elites were divided among themselves. 
However, the dominant discourse, until the establishment of the Republic, was the 
perspective adopted by the second group of intellectuals, who made a distinction
Göle, Modem Mahrem, 17-47.
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between the good and bad aspects of the Western civilization. As Göle points out, 
even the westemists were trying to find legitimacy for their larguments in Islam^ .^ 
It was the emergence of the Kemalists that marked the triumph of westemists over 
the conservatives.
This concern with the tension between modernity and tradition and the 
attempt to reach a balance between the two was a recurring theme accompanying 
Turkish modernization and it can easily be observed in the literary tradition 
extending fi-om the Tanzimat to the Republic. It would be illuminating here to 
refer to two important novels whose main theme is the extent to which 
Westernization should be understood. One of these is Felatun Bey ile Rakım 
Efendi by Ahmet Mithad which was published in 1876; and the other is Recaizade 
Ekrem's novel Araba Sevdası which was published in 1896.*  ^The first novel is a 
comparison of an imitative, cosmetic, and skin-deep and therefore unpreferred 
model of Westernization on the one hand, and a preferred one which is 
distinguished from the first one by an effort to hold on to indigenous cultural 
values. Felatun Bey is depicted as the representative of the former, whereas Rakım 
Efendi represents the latter model of Westernization. F'elatun Bey is from a very 
rich family, and spends his time gambling and entertaining with women. Rakım 
Efendi, on the other hand, is a serious, hard-working, and modest person. It is 
obvious in the novel that Rakım Efendi is presented as the representative of the
*^For a review of these two novels, see Şerif Mardin, Jiirk Modernleşmesi (Turkish 
Modernization), pp. 36-40. Mardin discusses these novels by contextualizing them in the Turkish 
modernization process.
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preferred model of Westernization by keeping away from exaggerated 
consumption and by holding to such traditional values as modesty.
Bihruz Bey is the character of the second well-known novel which 
exemplifies the concern with the limits of Westernization mentioned above. Bihruz 
Bey is a lazy, incompetent man but nevertheless lives a comfortable life thanks to 
his father's fortunes. He constantly makes fun of the traditional costumes of the 
Turks and refers to them as barbaric. He dresses himself in the European style with 
expensive costumes. This character of Bihruz Bey is depicted as the representative 
of the cosmetic Westernization with the purpose of criticizing that trend.
In addition to the difficult task of balancing the requirements of 
modernization and tradition, the two novels also illustrate another such recurring 
theme, the utmost importance given by the westemists to the changes in life 
styles. The consumption items from clothes to furniture, have always had a 
symbolic value in Turkish modernization. Those intellectuals who viewed Western 
civilization as a totality tried to change their life styles too. The conservatives, on 
the other hand, were maintaining that only material civilization of the West should 
be taken and not the non-material aspects.
In this context it does not come as a surprise that the third recurring issue 
accompanying the Turkish modernization came to be identified with the 'woman 
question'. Since the changes in life styles can best be observed in the changes in 
women's lives, the litmus test for modernization has been the changing role and 
status of women in the society. The native Orientalists, who perceived the 
indigenous cultural traits that basically derived from an Islamic way of life as an
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obstacle on the road to civilization, made the veiling and the seclusion of women 
an open target of attack. They viewed these traditions as the symbols of the 
oppressive nature and the backwardness of Islam. One of these intellectuals, 
Abdullah Cevdet, for instance argued that the main reason for the backwardness 
and inferiority of the Muslim societies was such "degenerated traditions" as veil, 
polygyny and the seclusion of genders.“ Consequently, some reforms with the aim 
of improving the status of women were initiated by the modemizingAVestemizing 
elites of the time. The 1858 Land Reform gave equal inheritance rights to girls and 
boys; secondary schools and teachers' and midwifery schools for girls were 
opened.“  As a result of such changes during the Second Constitutional Period 
(1909-1918), in the atmosphere of relative freedom created by the 1908 Yoimg 
Turk Revolution, women increasingly began to move into the public sphere. For 
instance, educated women from the intellectual circles of the cities started 
publishing magazines and forming women associations.*" The increasing public 
appearance of women, in turn, brought with it the discussions about the veiling of 
women, because women had begun to dress in accordance with the Western 
fashion and to behave more flexibly with regard to veiling.
This change in position of women was a serious challenge to the 
traditional Islamic values that shaped the public life and hence the relations 
between men and women. Those intellectuals who were in favor of only material *
** Göle, Modem Mahrem, 31.
”  Şirin Tekeli, Kadınlar ve Siyasal Toplumsal Hayat ( İstanbul: Birikim Yaymlan, 1986), 182.
60 Ibid.
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borrowing from the Western civilization were against these changes in the position 
of the women and their increasing visibility in the public realm. As opposed to the 
first group of intellectuals who established a parallelism between the improvement 
of the women' s social position and social progress, these intellectuals were 
claiming that there could be only a negative correlation between women's fi-eedom 
and progress. Said Halim Pasha, for instance, went as far as arguing that 
civilizations throughout the history had come to the point of decay and 
disappearance with women's gaining their full fi'eedoms'^V The conservatives 
maintained that the decline experienced by the Ottoman Empire was caused by the 
abandoiunent of the Islamic way of life and that without loyalty to the Islamic 
precepts the society would be dissolved. For them women's moving into the public 
life was contrary to an Islamic way of life. They believed that the progress was 
possible only if Sharia (Islamic law) became the organizing principle of the 
society. Eventually, women's dress came to be the symbol of being either a 
Westemist or an Islamist; that is either a reformist or a conservative*^. For the 
initiators of the reforms, xmveiling of women was the symbol of women’s 
emancipation from religious bonds.
In fact, these three recurring issues, achievement of a balance between 
modernity and tradition, the preoccupation with costumes and life styles, and the 
debates concerning women- should be viewed as part of a broader picture. These 
debates and the accompanying reforms initiated by westernizing elites during the
Göle, Modem Mahrem,30.
Aynur Ilyasoğlu, Örtülü Kimlik (Istanbul: Metis Yaymlan, 1991), 50.
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period extending from the Tanzimat to the Republic were the first steps of a great 
social engineering project whose aim was to create a public composed of secular- 
minded, rational, modernized, westernized, that is 'civilized' citizens. In today’s 
political context this project of social engineering is referred to as Kemalism.
Secularism and positivism were the two pillars of the modernization efforts 
throughout the Tanzimat (1839), Islahat Fermam (Reform Decree)(1856), The 
First Constitutional Period (1876-1909) and the Second Constitutional Period 
(1909-1918). They reached their institutional and ideological peak in 1923 with 
the establishment of the secular republic.
The Kemalist elite took a much sharper turn toward modernization, with 
the goal of taking the newly established Turkish Republic to the level 
contemporary western civilization (muassir medeniyet seviyesi). It should be noted 
here that Kemalist project of modernization was different from the modernization 
efforts that had been in process since the nineteenth century in one crucial respect: 
the modemizing/westemizing elites of the Tanzimat and the early Republican 
period experienced a duality. Their main preoccupation was how to achieve a 
balance between the materiality of the West and the spirituality of the Hast. They 
even tried to find legitimacy for their actions in Islam. The Kemalist project of 
Westernization, on the other hand, broke away with this duality turning its face 
completely to the West. The Istanbul correspondent of a foreign newspaper was 
underlining this point when he wrote "the Turkish republic has broken all of its 
ties with the Asian traditions, adopted Western civilization with its mentality.
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ideals, and principles; it has definitely said good-bye to the East."*  ^In other words, 
Kemalist modernization and the nationalism of 1923 mark the triumph of the 
Westemists over the conservatives in this debate, lienee, the establishment of the 
Republic was the beginning of another phase in the Turkish modernization process 
where the EastAVest duality has been addressed by creating a new 'nation' and a 
civilization.
The notion of an Islamic state was anathema to Mustafa Kemal and his 
supporters. They thought that such a state would maintain the status quo and 
perpetuate the backwardness of Turkey. The Kemalists wanted to see Turkey 
transformed into a modem nation-state which, in the words of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk would "live as an advanced and civilized nation in the midst of 
contemporary civilization."^ In Atatürk’s view such a nation had to be secular, 
rational, and give priority to scientific development. The goal of transforming 
Turkey into a modem nation-state denoted a much more radical change than a 
change in the state system from monarchy to republic. Its objective was to change 
social modes of conduct, life styles, and even ways of thinking and worldviews.
As Feroz Ahmad observes, the Kemalists regarded themselves as the 
molders of the public opinion and the vanguard destined to lead Turkey into the 
modem world into civilized nations.^  ^ They were devoted to the idea of change 
and were impatient with tradition which they saw as a barrier to progress. The
“  Göle, Modem Mahrem, (translated by the author)49. 
^  Ahmad, The Making o f Modem Turkey, 53.
65 Ibid., 77.
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Kemalists embraced the idea that civilization is a totality which cannot be 
separated into two distinct parts and therefore should be adopted in toto.®* 
Moreover, they claimed that "civilization is defined in universal terms, time and 
context free, and is certainly not the product of a particularistic culture. This, in 
turn, meant an embracement of a universalistic definition of modernization. At the 
same time, the Kemalists maintained that this conception of modernization "needs 
to be backed up by political will to master the particularistic religious culture and 
progress is conceived and posed in oppositional terms to the local Islamic 
cu l t u r e .The  main goal according to this formulation was that of being liberated 
from the chains of a particularistic culture in order to reach the level of 
contemporary civilization. "The destruction of the Ottoman Empire proved to be a 
blessing, for the Turks were now free to rediscover themselves and to make a fresh 
start by abandoning a decadent part. This attitude was also in keeping with the 
influence of the French revolutionaiy tradition and positivism on radical 
thought."*® The Kemalists were inspired by the Jacobin tradition .
In an attempt to create a totally new society, Kemalists had to create "a new 
type of Turk very different from the Ottoman."** However, this was easier said 
than done, because they had inherited a society in which the notion of a Turkish 
identity was almost non-existent. Until the nineteenth century people had been
^ Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey", in Civil Society in 
the Middle East, A.R. Norton ed., (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 22.
Ibid.
68 Ahmad, The Making o f Modem Turkey, 77. 
Ibid.
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identifying themselves by their religious affiliation. Moreover, it should be noted 
here that in the late Ottoman Empire 'Turk' was a pejorative term used for the 
unsophisticated and peasants, tribesmen or small-town dwellers. People, if they 
had a choice, preferred to be identified as 'Ottomans', members of a stratum with 
its own culture and language (called Ottoman and not Turkish) which transcended 
the bounds of race and religion. It was the Europeans who spoke of “Turkey” and 
“Turks’”".
However, the foundation of a modem nation-state was seen as "the key 
element of the will to civilization"’ .^ Moreover, it was dining this process of 
creating a nation-state that the two pillars of the Turkish modernization, namely 
secularism and positivism, began to dominate the whole scene. As Metin I leper 
has pointed out, the idea of the state employed by the Kemalists was derived from 
a reaction to two fundamental problems which they saw as the main cause of the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire.’  ^First, the Ottoman State was identified with the 
personal mle of the sultan which eventually led to its inability to compete with the 
European nation-states system. Second, the Islamic basis of the Ottoman state was 
regarded as the primary obstacle to progress and the main cause of the 
perpetuation of the backwardness in Ottoman society.’^  "For the Kemalist 
intelligentsia, therefore, there was a need to create a nation-state distinct from the 
person of the sultan and secular enough to reduce Islam to the realm of individual
'^Ibid
Keyman, "Global Modernity and Nationalism", 102.
72 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (WalkingtoniThe Eothen Press, 1985), 49-50.
^^See also Keyman, "Global Modernity and Nationalism", ppl09-110 for an analysis of Heper’s 
account of the notion of the state employed by the Kemalists.
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faith."’'* According to Heper, what underlied the idea of the state employed by the 
Kemalists is that Atatürk and his associates were influenced by the Durkheimian 
conception of the state as the agent of rationality. As he points out, according to 
Durkheim "the role of the state is not to express the imconsidered thoughts of the 
crowd, but rather add to them more mature thoughts."’* The state takes its 
inspiration from the genuine feelings and desires of the nation. Atatürk assumed 
that the people had great potential. It was necessary, however, to activate this 
potential. The people by themselves were neither willing nor capable of achieving 
this basic goal. During the long centuries of personal rule of the sultans the people 
had lost their capacity to take the initiative.’* Atatürk’s conclusion was that 
reforms needed to be imposed from above. Consequently, the Kemalist idea of the 
state was ""embedded in the question of how to activate the people toward the goal 
of civilization, that is, how to construct a national identity compatible with the will 
to civilization."”  This, in turn, indicates the manufactured character of the 
republican Turkish identity. Therefore, as Kadıoğlu argues, the question of 
nationality in the Turkish polity was not posed as 'Who are the Tmks?', but rather 
as 'Who and/or how are the Turks going to be?'’*
Keyman, "Global Modernity and Nationalism", 103.
’’ Heper, The State Tradition, 50.
Ibid.
Keyman, "Global Modernity and Nationalism", 103.
Ayşe Kadıoğlu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official 
Identity", Turkey: Idenity, Democracy, Politics, S. Kedourie ed. (London: Frank Cassand 
Co.Ltd., 1996), 121.
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This process of the construction of the national identity is crucial in 
understanding the debates over the turban question in Turkey. It was during that 
debate that the relationship between public and private spheres on the one hand 
and the notion of citizenship on the other came to the agenda. The creation of a 
secular national identity excluded and marginalized Islamic identity. Islam 
disappeared from the public realm and was reduced to the realm of individual 
faith.
The very target of the Kemalist reformers was the hold of religion on the 
polity and the society. "One basic goal was to bring institutional secularization as 
disengagement to its logical conclusion: to completely free the polity from 
religious considerations. Islam was not supposed to have even the function of a 
'civil religion’ for the Turkish polity."”  As Sencer Ayata has argued, the 
government not only tried to contain the role of Islam in society, but also took 
steps to reform Islam according to its own vision "the aim was gradual 
crystallization of a Tvukish concept of Islam as a religion in the Western, i.e. the 
post French Revolution, sense of the term.*® It was to resemble the Protestant 
tradition that placed emphasis on the absolute privacy of individual conscience."**
As Richard Tapper heis argued, Atatürk was aware of the dual functions of 
religion: the private one of giving intellectual and emotional meaning to life, an 
ethics, an eschatology and the promise of salvation; and the public function of
Metin Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society; A Middle Eastern Perspective", British Journal o f 
Middle Ewitem Studies, 18 (1991), 350.
Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party and the State: the Politicization of Islam in Turkey", Middle 
East Journal, Volume 50, No.l, Winter 1996, 42.
Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society”, 351.
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providing a political ideology, a cultural and commimal identity and social 
solidarity. He weis not openly against Islam in the former role, but (like many of 
his predecessors) strongly disapproved of the latter.*  ^His solution to the quest for a 
unifying value system as the foundation of the newly established nation-state was 
that of replacing religion with a modem secular ideology and the values of 
republican rationalism. The Kemalists took rationalism as a substitute for Islam. 
Consequently, the answer to the question of 'who and/or how are the Tmks going 
to be?' was found in the creation of a public composed of nationalist, scientifically 
minded, anti-traditional, secular individuals. The public realm would be composed 
of intelligent, cooperative, patriotic, and moral 'citizens* in addition to their 
above-mentioned characteristics.
This conception of the relationship between citizenship and religion 
through a separation of public and private spheres was a Western, or more 
specifically, a post French Revolution idea which has developed together with the 
notion of nation-state. By adopting this stance towards religion, the republican 
elites in Turkey tried to take the religion out of the public sphere. To use Şerif 
Mardin's term they "showed a clear distaste for religion" and consequently, they 
initiated radical changes on the state structure and public institutions.
Two observations can be made regarding the Turkish modernization 
process. First, rather than Anglo-Sakson liberalism, French Jacobinism, with its 
highly centralized model of change became the prototype for reform of Turkish
Richard Tapper, “Introduction" in Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in 
a Secular State, ed. R. Tapper (London, New York: LB. Tauris, 1991), 5-6.
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modeniists. Hence, "secularization itself became part of that process of social 
engineering rather than an outcome of the process of modernization and societal 
development"“ . This was closely related to the fact that in Turkey, as in other 
Muslim countries, secularism has been considered to be the prerequisite of 
Westernization rather than democratization. As a result, secularism as a modernist 
ideology in Turkey, is linked to the state's control of the public sphere“ . "Turkish 
secularism has meant the banning of religious orders, dress codes for public 
servants, and the imposition of certain types of audio-visual programming at state 
radio stations and television channels."** The purpose here was that of teaching and 
imposing a modem way of life and thereby excluding and marginalizing the 
Islamic identity.
The second observation that we can make regarding the Kemalist reforms 
is that, those reforms extended far beyond the modernization of state apparatus and 
the transition to a secular republic from a multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. They 
attempted to change the lifestyles, the ways the people behave and think; they 
attempt to change the self-conception of the Ttuks. This was due to the fact that 
the Kemalist elites took Western civilization as an indivisible force. "The project 
of modernization in a Muslim coxmtry takes a very different turn from Western 
modernity in that it imposes a political will to 'westernize' the cultural code, modes 
of life, and gender identities. The Tiu'kish history of modernization can be
Nilüfer Göle, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The making of Elites and Counter-Elites", 




considered a radical example of such a cultural shift, one that actualizes a 
civilizational conversion. The aim of the secularization efforts in question was 
to teach and impose an modem way of life which was considered to be 
homogenous and standardized.
As part of this social engineering project, the secular elites employed a 
distinction between a 'civilized' and an 'uncivilized' way of life. They were 
referring to these categories as a la franca (European way), and a la turca (the 
Turkish way) respectively. Hence, being 'civilized' implied having such 
characteristics as wearing neckties, shaving beards and mustaches, eating with 
fork and knife, husband and wife walking hand-in-hand in the streets, wearing 
hats, going to the theater, and listening to classical western music.*’ As for the 
women, for one thing they had to uncover their heads.
These changes in life styles were illustrating a cultural shift from an 
Islamic to a Western culture. This shift, in turn, has created a social stratification 
in the Turkish society. As Göle points out, rather than the concept of "social class" 
that explains social inequalities in terms of economic power, the concept of "status 
group" that includes life styles and cultural codes defines social stratification in
86 Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism”, 21, emphasis added.
^^ It is meaningfiil to refer to a recent event, the opening concert of the Ankara Music Festival that 
took place on 31 March, 1997, which illustrates that these kind of attributes of being a civilized, 
secular citizen are still being given the utmost importance, even an unwarranted importance. At 
that occasion Mr. Süleyman Demirel, the President of Republic, greeted the orchestra and the 
crowd in tlie concert hall by saying "Look! Tliis is tlie picture of the modem Turkey.” The crowd 
(approximately ten thousand people) applaused enthusiastically and responded with the slogan 
"Turkey is a secular country and will remain so!” {Türkiye laiktir, laik kalacaki). This event has 
occupied an important place in the Turkish media during the following week after the concert. 
The concert was being referred to as "the feast of civilization" (medeniyet şöleni\ "the day of 
modernity” {çağdaşlık günü), "the magnificent concert” (muhteşem konser).
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Turkish society.“  It is in this realm of cultural codes and life styles that the 
struggle between Republican elites and Islamists has been taking place since the 
early years of the Republic. It was not, therefore, surprising that women's 
headdress was always, and continues to be, a major concern for both the 
Republican secular elites and the Islamists. The Kemalists, like their predecessors, 
were influenced by the Orientalist narrative of Islam which maintained that Islam 
is the main obstacle on the road to civilization and that this backwardness and the 
oppressive nature of Islam was epitomized in the veiled women.
The penetration of secularism into the daily lives of the people is best 
illustrated by women’s physical and social visibility. Participation of women in 
public life and their socialization with men defined the modem secular way of life 
and indicated a shift away fi’om an Islamic way of life. Women, as the 
representatives of this new modem way of life, were becoming increasingly visible 
in public life; they were appearing in photographs as unveiled women, women in 
athletic competitions, women pilots, women professionals in European clothing.
The reforms initiated by the Kemalist elites to improve the women's 
position in society were part of a broader project of reorganizing life by replacing 
a form of social organization fi’amed by Islam with a secular western one. Two of 
these reforms were responsible for dramatic improvements in women's lives: the 
1926 adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and the 1934 passage of universal suffrage. 
The Civil Code encouraged women's recognition as citizens within the polity by 
declaring polygyny and marriage by proxy illegal and granting women equal rights
‘ Göle, "Secularism and Islamism”, 51.
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with men regarding divorce, custody of children and inheritance. Women were 
given the right to vote in local elections in 1932 and national elections in 1934.
The striking thing about these reforms regarding Turkish women is that 
women did not have to organize themselves into a protest movement or a pressure 
group to struggle for their rights. The founding fathers of the Republic, under the 
leadership of K.emal Atatürk, granted full rights of citizenship to women about a 
decade after the War of Independence. Men, rather than women promoted 
women’s rights in Turkey. Yesim Arat calls this situation as "the patriarchal 
paradox"*’, because in a patriarchal society like Turkey, it is assumed that the 
imequal power relationship between men and women work against women to keep 
them away from public life. As we have seen, however, the reforms introduced by 
male Kemalist intelligentsia granted full rights of citizenship to women which 
allowed a status for women which did not exist even in many Western democracies 
at that time.
This makes one ask why the Kemalist intelligentsia introduced these 
reforms. Was the granting of women's rights ein end in itself, or was it a strategic 
move to serve other ends? Şirin Tekeli has argued that they were means to an end 
rather than ends in themselves.”  According to Tekeli, the main goal was to utilize 
the symbolic value of the improvement of women's status in society. More 
specifically, the efforts to change the women's position was means of westernizing 
the country.
Yeşim Arat, The Patriarchal Paradox: Women Politicians in Turkey (London &Toronto: 
Associated University Press, 1989), 131.
Tekeli, Kadınlar, 216.
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The goal of transforming Turkey into a civilized nation and Atatiirk's
sensitivity toward European's perception of Turkish women can easily be observed
in his speeches. On an occasion Atatürk declared that:
In some places I see women who hide their faces and eyes by throwing a 
piece of fabric, a scarf, or something like that over their heads, even when 
a man passes by, they turn their backs to him or close up by sitting on the 
ground. What is the meaning and explanation of this behavior? Gentlemen, 
would the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation assume such an 
absurd and vulgar pose? This is a situation that ridicules our nation. It has 
to be corrected immediately.®*
On the question of transforming the nation into a western civilized entity 
Kandiyoti points out that the concern with women's rights, particularly about the 
issues of seclusion, veiling and polygyny, coincided with a broader agenda on 
'progress'.®  ^The new women of the Kemalist era became an explicit symbol of the 
break with the past, a symbolism which Mustafa Kemal himself did much to 
promote. He did so personally through the inclusion of Latife İlanım, his wife, in 
his public tours, through his relations with his adoptive daughters and through his 
broader endorsement of women's visibility. This has had a decisive influence on 
the socialization of the whole generation of women who internalized the Kemalist 
message and forged new identities as professionals as well as patriots.®^
^'Fгom a speech that Atatürk delivered in Kastamonu on August 30, 1925, in Zehra Arat, “Turkish 
Women and the Republican Reconstruction of Tradition” in M. Göçek and S. Balaghi, eds.. 
Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East: Tradition, Identity and Power (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), 105.
D. Kandiyoti, "End of Empire: Islam , Nationalism, and Women in Turkey" in Woman, Islam 
and the State, D.Kandiyoti ed. (Philedelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 36.
Ibid., 41.
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In analyzing the historical background of the construction of national 
identity in Turkey, especially during the single-party period (1923-1945), there are 
foxu· critical points that can be extrapolated: First and foremost, the notion of 
Turkish national identity was constructed on the basis of the notion of citizenship. 
Second, this notion of citizenship was formulated as a "militant citizen"*'* who is 
both the object and the subject of the Kemalist will to civilization. On one side 
citizens were viewed as the objects to be controlled and to be transformed into 
civilized persons, and on the other side, they were viewed as acting subjects, 
carriers of the project of modemization/westemization into the future generations. 
Third, this notion of citizenship is constructed upon the duties rather than rights of 
the 'citizen' who privileges his/her citizen identity over his/her individuality.^^ This 
in turn has been implemented by locating those aspects of identity that make 
individuals and groups different from each other in the private, as has been the 
case in Europe where the modem category of citizenship has developed. Fourth, 
this particular notion of national identity based upon the notion of citizenship has 
taken a monolithic character, by closing the public realm to the plurality of 
cultural differences.** In this understanding politics is defined on the basis of the 
priority of the 'common good' of the society as opposed to the priority of 
addressing different demands of a pluralist society.
Füsun Üstel,“Cumhuriyetten Bu Yana Yurttaş Profili” (The Profile of Citizenship Since the 
Republic), Yeni Yüzyıl., April, 24, 1996.
E.Fuat Keyman, “Kemalism, Modernité, Gelenek” (Kemalism, Modernity and Tradition), 
Toplum ve Bilim, No. 72, 1997, 90.
’*The term 'cultural differences' is here used to denote the process of differentiation among the 
identities which are shaped according to religious, ethnic affiliations, ideology and/or worldviews 
and differences in life styles preferences.
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Since the major concern of this study is the turban affair in Turkey and since 
it takes this affair as part of the phenomenon of the rise of Islamic identity in 
Tmkey, we have paid a special attention to the relation between the process of 
construction of national identity on one hand, and the state's attitude toward 
religion on the other. We have seen that the principle of secularism and positivism 
played the most important role in the process of the construction of the Turkish 
national identity which in turn resulted in the exclusion and marginalization of the 
Islamic identity. We have also seen that the origins of this principle of secularism 
goes back to the nineteenth century, to the first efforts of westernizing the country, 
but it reaches its peak with the emergence of the secular republican elites after
1923.
To speak in terms of the theoretical framework laid down in the previous
chapter, the development of the notion of citizenship in the Turkish polity was 
embedded in the process of creating a homogenous public. From the point of view 
of religion this meant embracing the post French Revolution idea of religion as a 
private affair, belonging to the realm of individual conscience. This 
conceptualization of citizenship in the Turkish context also takes us to the 
historical origins of the current debates over women's headdress and the 
concomitant polarization between seculars and Islamists in Turkey. Although the 
Kemalist elites did not go as far as outlawing the veil, it was strongly discouraged 
as was examined above. Unveiling of women was viewed as the symbol of taking 
religion out of the public realm.
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The case of women exemplifies very well the process of construction of the 
Turkish national identity on the basis of the notion of citizenship as a "militant 
citizen". On one hand they were the objects of the "Kemalist will to civilization"in 
that they were the most important section of the population to be changed, to be 
transformed into civilized persons.’’ They were strongly encotu'aged to uncover 
themselves, to adopt civilized manners of behaving. At the same time, they were 
the subjects, the bearers of the Kemalist will to civilization. Thus, the position of 
women is extremely important in understanding the development of the notion of 
citizenship in the Turkish polity. More specifically, it is where we see most clearly 
the relationship between this militant citizenship and religion, which is built in the 
separation of public and private and the confinement of religion within the public 
domain of the individual believer. The unveiling of women, their increasing 
visibility in the public realm signified this separation. So, it is out of this historical 
context that women’s headdress has been a major issue in Tiukey.
Keyman, “Kemalism, Modernité, Gelenek”, 101.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WOMEN’S HEAD-DRESS IN
THE POST-1980 PERIOD
The previous chapter was concerned with the profile of the citizen during 
the single-party period in Turkey. It was seen that secularism played the most 
important role in the shaping of this profile. However, it is often pointed out that 
despite the clear distaste for religion shown by the Republican secular elites and 
despite the fact that they have attempted the most radical secularizarization among 
the Muslim countries, the Kemalist ideology could not replace Islam in the lives of 
the people. The Republican elites’ attempts to create a new ideology was only skin- 
deep and was not internalized by all the classes. In this context it does not come as 
siuprise that the issue of women’s veiling has remained a major issue during the 
following decades.
The single-party period came to an end in Turkey with the coming to 
power of the Democrat Party after the 1950 general elections. With this transition
to a multi-party system, the Islam-state relationship has undergone a 
tremsformation. This chapter will be an examination of the main dynamics of this 
relationship and of the question of how this general issue has been reflected on the 
controversy over the women’s headdress throughout the multi-party period. This 
period will be divided into two: the 1950-1980 period and post-1980 period will be 
analyzed separately. This periodization is not without a basis. The 1980s marked
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the beginning of a new era in Turkish political life with regard to the state- 
pluralism relationship especially from the point of view of religion. A trend has 
been set towards challenging the early Kemalist principles. During the last ten to 
fifteen years, as opposed to the presentation of the case by the official state 
discourse, it has increasingly become clear that the Turkish society is not a 
homogenous entity. The differences that were delegated to the private have 
increasingly begun to be visible in the public. Especially after the 1980 military 
intervention Turkey has come face to face with problems stemming from the 
political demands on the basis of cultural differences. The rise of Islamic identity, 
the demands for recognition by the Kurdish population and the rise of Kurdish 
nationalism, the rise of Alevi identity were among the most important 
developments in that sense. Besides, the feminist movement has been effective in 
putting the 'woman question' at the center of the process of "rewriting Turkish 
historiography"’*. Despite significant differences among them, all these 
movements directly challenge the unifying conception of cultural identity on the 
basis of which secularist Turkish nationalism reproduces itself. Two of these 
developments have been especially influential in this increasing awareness of the 
differences that are tried to be covered by the concept of Turkish national 
identity'; one is the rise of Islamic identity since 1980, and the other is the 
resurgence of Kurdish nationalism in an organized form.
What is most important from the point of view of this study is the fact that 
Tinkey, like several other Middle Eastern countries, has been experiencing the
98 Keyraan, "Global Modernity and Nationalism", 95.
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political revitalization of Islam since the early 1980s. Bassam Tibi distinguishes 
between 'traditional' and 'political' Isliun in accoimting for the sociopolitical factors 
behind the politicization of Islam: whereas traditional Islam is confined mostly 
within the private domain of the believer, political Islam has pushed its way into 
the public realm” . Political Islam sees itself as having a political mission. The 
factors behind the rise of political Islam in Turkey will be analyzed later in this 
chapter, but it should be said from the outset that it is with the emergence of the 
difference between traditional and political Islam that the turban question became 
a political issue in Turkey. This claim would be more comprehensible if  we first 
make an analysis of the main characteristics of the state-religion relationship and 
of how this general issue was reflected on the question of women’s veiling during 
the earlier decades.
The 1950s were the years of the Democrat Party (DP) government as the 
majority party. The DP’s attitude towards religion was different from the militant 
secularism of the Republican People’s Party, the party of the single party period. It 
had a more flexible attitude with regard to the religious circles in the society which 
is often pointed out as a major reason behind the success of the DP at the 1950 
general elections. After coming to power, the DP converted the £zan (the call for 
prayer) into Arabic again and allowed the opening new Quoran courses and other 
Islamic educational institutions. Accordingly, the new government adopted a more 
flexible attitude towards women’s headcovering. This in turn faced with a serious 
criticism from the opposition so much so that on March 13, 1956 three members of
^ Bassam Tibi, Islam and the Cultural Accommodation o f Social Change (BouldenWestview 
Press, 1990), 25.
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parliament who at the same time were members of Turkish Women’s Association 
came up with a bill aiming at the prohibition of çarşaf, a particular dress that 
covers the whole body except the eyes.‘°® The motive behind this attempt was the 
claim that this particular dress was humiliating for the Turkish nation. Although 
this bill was not debated in the parliament, it generated considerable interest 
among the public.
It should be noted, however, that in the 1950s Turkish women were not 
playing an active role in the public life. The idealized image of the Turkish 
woman, who is supposed to reach a balance between a certain degree of 
westernization and the maintenance of traditional values, had not been internalized 
by the majority of women. Those who found a place in arts, politics, or science 
were either the ones who had been totally westernized and alienated from their 
own society, or those who conceived westernization as a change only in their life 
styles. Hence, this minority group held already got rid of their headcovers. They 
had accepted this as the sine qua non of being a civilized person. The majority, on 
the other hand, mostly in rural areas, had never given up veiling themselves. 
However, it would be a mistake to view these women as the representatives of a 
protest movement against the westernizing reforms of the time. Instead, they 
represented the continuation of traditional modes of behavior rather than a political 
mission. In other words, although it was a debated issue, women’s headdress was 
not a political issue in the 1950s. The westemists who were against the veiling of 
women perceived it as an improper, or rather, uncivilized way of dressing that
IW Cihan Aklaş, Kılık Kıyafet ve İktidar  ^ (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınlan, 1989), v.l, 219.
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ridiculed the Turkish nation in the eyes of the western nations. It was not perceived 
as a symbol of a reactionary movement aiming at the elimination of the impact of 
the Republican reforms in the society. This was not what the veiled women had in 
mind either.
This has continued to be the case during the 1960s too, although the 
attitude of the governments toward religion differed from that of the DP. On May 
27, 1960 a military intervention took place in Turkey. The military stated that the 
main reason behind the intervention weis that the previous government had taken 
steps challenging the Republican principles. Short after the intervention. Cemal 
Gürsel, head of the National Unity Committee, said that they would not tolerate 
those who used religious beliefs for political purposes. In the same speech he 
referred to çarşaf as a shame for the Turkish women.
In 1960, the Mustafa Kemal Association organized a meeting and prepared 
its program for the struggle against the veil which continued throughout the 
decade. According to this program, “all distinguished women were asked to 
deliver their overcoats to those women who had to wear çarşaf since they could 
not afford to buy one”.‘“
During the 1960s some local measmes were taken to prevent the wearing 
of çarşaf. What is striking about these developments is the persistence of the 
preoccupation with ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ costumes and lifestyles among the 
westemists. As against the veiled women, women who wore mini-skirts which
Ibid., 228.
Ibid., translated the author.
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became quite fashionable during the 1960s, were portrayed as the idealized, 
modem, civilized Turkish women.
Within the same time period an institution called Modem Life Education 
Center (Modem Hayat Öğretim Yurdu) organized nine-month courses in squatter 
settlements in Ankara with the aim of teaching yoimg women how to dress, talk, 
walk, and eat like a ‘modem woman’. At the end of the course, the successful 
students would get a certificate which gave them the attribute of modem woman.
The late 1960s were also the years when feminist ideas began to be voiced 
in Tiukey. The feminists of the time were claiming that the rights granted to 
women were not being exercised by the majority of Turkish women. The major 
reason for them was the ignorance of those women who needed to be educated and 
rescued from the ‘primitive’ life they were living which unquestionably included 
rescuing them fi’om the veil. The veil was seen as an obstacle on the way to 
become a modem woman who learns, develops her skills and fights for her rights.
What is most significant for our purposes about the 1950s and 1960s is that 
dining this period we cannot talk about the issue of women’s headdress as a 
political issue. However, the 1970s were different in the sense that it was the 
period during which the notion of Islamic identity began to take shape. During the 
student movements of the late 1960s, the Islamist groups were included in the 
right-wing camp together with the nationalist groups. In the following years, 
however, these groups began to differentiate themselves from each other.
Especially the late 1970s were the years during which extensive debates 
took place within the Islamic movement. The identity, social status and role of
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women and veiling were the issues at the heart of these debates. During the time 
period in question women had begun to play an active role in the public realm in 
such areas as education, workplace, and cultural activities. This in turn had 
unleashed debates over traditional gender roles.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was quite influential in the way that veiled 
women were perceived in Turkey. The most striking thing about the Islamic 
movement that dismantled the Shah regime in Iran was the active role that women 
played during the Revolution. After that the debate over the veil has acquired a 
new dimension. The political role of Islam and the militancy of the veiled women 
began to be discussed. By that time, some Islamic periodicals had begun to be 
published in which women were being warned against the passivity of Muslims 
and were called to read, write and think about their identities. The aim was to help 
the process of the development of a new Muslim women identity different from 
the traditional Muslim women of the earlier decades. At the same time, though 
they were very few, veiled students had become visible at universities at large 
metropolitan centers.
These developments leading to the emergence of the notion of Islamic 
identity during the 1970s were the first traits of political Islam which has risen in 
the 1980s in Turkey as has been the situation in several other Middle Eastern 
countries. The many factors behind the current revitalization of Islam have been 
the concern of numerous studies in the literature. With regard to the Turkish case, 
it can be argued that several international and internal factors have played
103 Ibid, 236.
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important roles in the rise of political Islam which in turn has opened up a new 
chapter in the debate over the women’s headdress.
The most critical international development has been the process of 
globalization. Ayşe Kadıoğlu argues that one of the most significant consequences 
of globalization is the shattering of homogenous, standardized cultures in an 
international order whose main political actors were the nation-states“”. In this 
respect globalization paradoxically led to the emergence of local identities.
It is meaningful to refer at this point to Ronald Robertson's analysis of this 
paradox from the point of view of religion. According to Robertson it would be 
erroneous to view the contemporary politicization of religion as constituting a 
unique historical circumstance, because,
what stands out as unique in historical and comparative perspectives is the 
strength of the process of differentiation which yielded relatively separate 
spheres of politics and religion, as well as the force of the myths that have 
sustained these processes“**.
In a parallel line of thinking, Stachouse notes that the ideas that religion is 
and should be 'private' and 'non-political' and the state is 'public' and secular derive 
in large measure from the enormous impact that a specific religious tradition has 
had upon modem Western social life“*®. However, while there can be no doubt 
about the intra-westem origins of these ideas, their impact has not been restricted 
to western societies. The ideas concerning the distinctiveness of the private non-
'®^Kadioglu,"The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism”, 130. 
Robertson, “Globalization, Politics, Religion”, 12.
Cited in ibid., 14.
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political nature of religion; and the public and secular nature of the state, which 
Stachouse traces to a specific religious tradition in the West, spread across most of 
the world between the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Robertson 
observes that whenever these ideas were in circulation, they clearly encountered 
indigenous civilizational conceptions of the relationship between state and 
religion. He cites Turkey as one of the places that has been experiencing this 
problematical situation. Robertson concludes by claiming that "religion has been 
politicized quite drastically during the past fifteen years or so following a period of 
diffusion of the idea, of the separateness of the spheres of religion and politics"“*’.
These arguments about the relevance of the contemporary process of 
globalization to the phenomenon of the politicization of religion also exemplifies 
the tension between the universal and the particular, or, between cultural 
homogenization and cultural heterogenization accompanying the process of 
globalization that we have referred before. Moreover, this discussion provides 
further insight to oiu* earlier contextualization of the question of the state-religion 
relation with reference to the Orientalist discourse.
What we can extrapolate fi"om the arguments about globalization is that the 
total exposure of the Turkish society to global modernity, which gained 
momentum with the adoption of the liberal, export-oriented economic policies, has 
radically transformed identity conceptions and social configurations in Turkey. 
This process has been accelerated by the exposme of the Turkish public to world 
wide television channels. In addition to that, the emergence of various Turkish
Ibid., 13-14.
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television channels has made it difficult to maintain the monolithic Turkish 
identity which has been depicted by the state-owned public channels. These radical 
transformations in identity conceptions and social configurations, however, led to 
ambivalence and uncertainty. As Keyman points out, "Islamic discourse acted 
successfully as an articulating principle of resistance to such uncertainty by 
identifying ambivalence with global modernity and certainty with community, that 
is, with a turn to religion"“®
Apart from the process of globalization, certain internal factors also 
prompted the opening of a new era in the Turkish political life especially with 
regard to the relationship between the state, religion and pliiralism. In the 1980s 
the most important development has been a softening of attitudes regarding 
secularism. The state elites began to make references to the significance of the 
Islamic identity of the Turks. As I leper observes, a related development has been 
the realization that an established religion might help enhance social control and 
limit the intensity of interest or class politics“®. Hence, Ataturkian principles were 
still emphasized but for the sake of arresting the spread of Marxism, fascism, and 
religious fundamentalism. In its preamble, the 1982 constitution made reference to 
Turkish historical and moral values'. Such references were in sharp contrast with 
the original Ataturkian approach, according to which the consciousness of the new 
Turk was to be rooted in science"®. The military regime between 1980-1983 relied
Keyman, "Global Modernity and Nationalism", 113. 
Heper, 'Islam, Polity and Society”, 351.
no Ibid., 350.
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on Atatürkian thought for the purpose of reconstructing Turkish historical and 
moral values. In a book by the office of the Chief of General Staff, published in 
1983, there were quotations from Atatürk not only on the state and on the 
principles of Atatürkism but also on such topics as personal relations, family life, 
youth, toleration, division of labor, and work solidarity“ *. Birtek and Toprak 
argue that the 1980 coup resulted in the transformation of state identity from 
radical secularist to "neo-republicanism" whose appeal to national imiformity was 
no longer dictated by the basic principles of Kemalist nationalism** .^ Instead, as 
Kcyman notes
(B)y incorporating Islamic discomse and implicitly taking umma (a 
community of believers who are united by the same (Islamic) faith) as its 
model of social organization, and also by abandoning the radical secularism 
of the early Republic to secure its popular support and to open up the 
domestic market to Islamic capital, the post-1980 military regime 
weakened the very conditions of existence of Kemalist nationalism and the 
republican state* *^ .
Of course that was not what the 1980 intervenors had in mind; they wanted 
to use Islam to bolster national unity. The use of Islamic discourse and its notion 
of umma was considered by the regime to be a temporary and pragmatic strategy 
restore the power of the Kemalist republican elite. It is often pointed out that this 
shift in the discourse of the state elites, especially of the military, was most 
probably prompted by the objective of arresting the spread of communism, and
' ' '  Heper, The State Tradition, 147.
' “ F. Birtek, and B.Toprak, “The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the 
Rise of Islamic Politics In Turkey: The Hazards of Rewriting Turkish Modernity”, Praxis 
International, 13, pp. 192-211.
'' * Keyman, "Global Modernity and Nationalism", 113.
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other extreme movements. However, it paved the way for the recognition of the 
reality of a Muslim way of life which in turn led to unintended consequences.
The first was the coming to power of the neo-liberal Motherland Party in 
the 1983 national election which was the beginning of civilian rule. This gave rise 
to the construction of a new state ideology whose performative acts are no longer 
bound with radical secularism and the populist conception of the people but are 
"embedded in laissez-faire market ideology, the managerial and technocratic 
understanding of the state and the dissemination of the discourse of the economic 
rationality within Turkish society"“ '*. Islam now started to take its place as a 
source, alongside science, for public policies. The 'technical elites' within the 
governing Motherland Party tried to develop "a synthesis between Islamic values 
and pragmatic rationality, through reconciling the former cultural orientations with 
the requisites of economic growth and Western democracy"“*.
Secondly, the regime's temporary and pragmatic appeal to Islamic 
discourse has become one of the enabling factors for the Islam to provide a theme 
for political participation. This meant the emergence of Islamic organizations 
within both state and civil society as both political party and as tarikat (the 
religious brotherhoods) and also their increasing strength within the Tmkish 
political landscape.
So, notwithstanding its Kemalist orientation, the 1980 military intervention 
opened a "discursive space for the revitalization of the language of difference, a
"Mbid., 112.
Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society”, 52.
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discursive space which created a possibility for the marginalized and silenced 
identity to surface and express its resistance to the national secular identity"“ .^ In 
the comse of these developments there also emerged some groups who have put 
forward their criticisms regarding the shifts in the discourse of the state elites and 
expressed their wish for the reconstruction of the official Turkish identity in the 
early republican sense. Consequently, the debates and clashes between the 
Kemalist-secular groups and others who are more tolerant towards religious 
images have begun to constitute the polarized political cleavages in Turkey in the 
1990s.
It can be argued, therefore, that the rise of Islamic identity in Turkey is not 
without basis. This study sees it as the combined effect of certain external and 
internal factors as examined above. The rise of political Islam and the 
revitalization of the language of difference through the surfacing of the 
marginalized Islamic identity have made the question of citizenship quite critical. 
The notion of citizenship lies at the center of the problematic relationship between 
the modem category of nation-state and the requirements of a plural society. The 
present historical conjuncture which has been shaped by the process of 
globalization and the concomitant tension between cultural homogenization and 
cultural heterogenization, makes the formulation of a working organizing principle 
for that problematic relationship a necessity. As liberal democracy becomes the 
dominant form of government all over the world, nation-states face its weaknesses 
with regard to the plurality of specific identity needs.
’ Keyman, "Global Modernity and Nationalism", 113.
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In Turkey, during the last decades political Islam has taken important steps 
in filling the vacuum in civil society by building schools, mosques, foundations, by 
establishing solidarity organizations, new living areas, large-scale firms. It has 
created its own market within the communication sector; and it has gained 
significant political representation -both quantitatively and institutionally. Now it 
is engaged in a struggle to build its hegemony in these areas. The turbaned women 
became the symbol of this turn of Islam from its long-standing exile in the private, 
to a power/hegemony struggle in the public/political realms“ .^ They have become 
the symbol of the Islamization of the Txnkish life-world. Islamist politics clearly 
define the role of the individual in the community and the central issue has become 
the control of women's sexuality and social separation of sexes.
It is important to refer at this point to an irony. As the second chapter has 
tried to show, women were of utmost importance for the secular elites of the single 
party period. Changes in women’s lives had a symbolic value since the penetration 
of secularism into the daily life is best illustrated by women's physical and social 
visibility. Hence, it was argued above that the case of women within the process of 
Turkish modernization is the most illustrative example for the notion of militant 
citizen who is both the object and the subject of the Kemalist will to civilization 
and who privileges her identity as citizen over her individuality. Ironically, women 
have played a central role in the rise of political Islam as well. The emergence of 
txurbaned women in the 1980s and 1990s has indicated the re—Islamization of 
public spaces as well as personal relations and daily practices. These women make
Sevda Alankuş-Kural, “Alternatif Kamular ve İslamcı Kadınlar”, Toplum ve Bilim, No. 72, 
1997, 7.
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'visible' the presence of Islam in the public realm which had been under the
hegemony of the secular-republican discourse. The fact that these women emerged
in large metropolitan centers which are the most modernized parts of the country
and, more interestingly, at the most prestigious universities in these cities which
are the representatives of the modernizing mentality of the Republic, makes their
protest even more significant. As Feride Acar observes, for many in Turkish
society in the late 1980s, it was an essentially incomprehensible anomaly that
educated young women bom and raised in a secular society became followers of
Islamist movements since they are seemingly “least likely cases”.
As Nilüfer Göle points out, contemporary Islamism is a cultural and
political deconstmction of the category of 'Muslim'“’. This new version of
Islamism is against both traditional interpretations of Islam on the one hand, and
modernism, on the other. It is a critique of and a discontinuity with the given
categories of Muslim identity. Its aim is to rename and reconstmct Miislim identity
by freeing it from traditional interpretations and by challenging modernism.
It is radical both in its critique of traditions, considered responsible for the 
passivity and 'enslavement' of the Muslim people, and in its desire to set up 
a radically different civilization based on the Islamization of all spheres of 
life from the conception of the self, to the organization of the life-world, 
and to the politics of government“®.
With regard to the turbaned women as representatives of this new version 
of Islamism Feride Acar makes the following observation:
' Feride Acar, “Women and Islam in Tuikey” in Şirin Tekeli ed., Women in Modern Turkish 
Society (London, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995), 54.
' ’’Göle, "Secularism and Islamism”, 51. 
Ibid., 54.
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For the first time in the Turkish Republic’s history, the conventional view 
which equated Islam with women’s ‘imprisonment’ at home was being 
challenged by the appearance of these women demanding an ‘Islamic way 
oflife’ through open political struggle in which they, very effectively, used 
the weapons and tactics of modem democracy.*^*
The radicalism of political Islam is also symbolized in the distinction 
between headscarf (başörtü) and turban (türban) that is often underlined by the 
women who wear the türban. As Kadioglu points out, this distinction stems not 
only from the various styles of head-dress representing different currents but also 
from the different background, education, public participation, and militancy of 
the women who cover their hair'“ . A headscarf is a smaller piece of cloth covering 
only the head and not the neck. It is worn by the women who follow traditional 
customs and behavior and whose activities are confined in the private realm 
usually without an active role in the public realm. Women who wear the headscarf 
mostly reside in small towns and on the outskirts of large cities in squatter 
settlements that were formed as a result of internal migration. As Kadioglu 
observes, women who wear the this head-dress include elderly women who were 
youngsters during the modernizing reforms of the 1920s and 1930s and who never 
internalized the new dress codes initiated by the Kemalists. To use Kadioglu's 
terms their perceptions are "pre-Kemalist rather than anti-Kemalist."'"^ They 
represent a continuation of traditional modes of behavior rather than a missionary, 
militant image as was the case during the 1950s and 1960s.
Acar, “Women and Islam in Turkey”, 47. 
Kadıoğlu, "Women's Subordination”, 655.
123 Ibid., 648.
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Women who wear the turban, on the other hand, represent a more activist 
group. The turban is an urban phenomenon and it symbolizes the political aspect 
of the Islamic movement in Turkey during the last decade. Most women who wear 
the türban are students of higher education. In the research that Nilüfer Göle has 
conducted, there are numerous references by the turbaned imiversity students to 
the difference between their headdress and the traditional style of headcovering, 
that is between the headscarf and the turban "^'*.
The origins of the 'turban affair' as a political issue dates to the military 
regime of the 1980-1983 period. In the same year that it took power, the military 
regime came up with proper dress codes for the civil servants which prohibited the 
veil for the women civil servants. It was considered as the symbol of a certain 
ideology‘s*. The next year the Ministry of Education put into force a regulation 
that prohibited the veiling of the students and teachers of the secondary 
educational institutions. By the time the President of Republic, Kenan Evren, also 
referred to the issue of women's head covering in his numerous speeches and 
expressed his disapproval of the veiling of women in public places. He argued that 
there could be no interference with the way women dress themselves at home, yet 
that there were certain requirements with regard to education and workplace‘s .
The dress codes for the civil servants and the students of secondary 
education were reinstated by the Higher Board of Education, which in December
GcAt, Modem Mahrem, 150.
Aktaş, KUtk Kıyafet ve İktidar, 102.
126 Ibid., 106.
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1982, forbade female university students to cover their heads while attending the 
classes. This raised a great reaction fix)m among the veiled students. Following this 
ban the issue of women's head covering became increasingly politicized. Since that 
time this issue has been at the center of a polarized debate in the Turkish public. 
The attitude of the state towards the turban has gone back and forth between a 
relatively increased level of flexibility and strict control. However, it is a fact that 
this issue has always remained as the most sensitive issue within the secular- 
Islamist polarity in Turkey.
The controversy over women's head-dress has involved politicians, 
bureaucrats, intellectuals, artists, businessmen, writers, students, and average 
citizens. The Turkish media alike, has covered these debates extensively and 
depicted them as the clash between the 'modem' women who wear short skirts and 
the 'traditional' who wear turban. The former group expressed publicly their 
disapproval of the latter by organizing expeditions to Atatiirk's mausoleum in 
Ankara.
The politicization of the issue of women's head covering and the 
accompanying polarization acquired increased momentum with the coming to 
power of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) in Turkey's December 24, 1995 general 
elections. In June 1996, the RP and the center-right secular True Path Party (TPP) 
formed a coalition government with the RP's leader, Necmettin Erbakan as the 
prime minister for the first two years of the coalition. The strong showing of the 
RP ensured that women's head-dress would remain one of the major points of 
political debate.
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In January 1997 the RP re-opened the issue to discussion by claiming that 
they would soon lift the ban on turban both for university students and for the civil 
servants. On February 2 of the same year, Prime Minister Erbakan opened to 
signature the decree that allowed the wearing of turban for the university students.
By the time the media was writing that Tansu Çiller, the leader of the TPP, 
was sympathetic towards the lifting of the ban at least for the university students if 
not for the public personnel. This, again, increased the degree of polarization 
between secular and Islamist groups. Some ministers from the TTP said they 
would resign rather than signing that decree. Some, like Yildirm Aktuna, said the 
türban might become the cause of the dissolution of the coalition government. Five 
women parliamentarians from different political parties organized a common press 
conference and declared that the turban is the symbol of a movement that 
challenges the basic values and principles of the republican state and that aims at 
establishing a state order on the basis of religious rules'^’. In a similar vein. 
Mümtaz Soysal, who is a professor of law, a member of parliament and a 
columnist in daily Hürriyet, argued that although the demands for the lifting of the 
ban on turban might at first sight seem as demands within the human rights 
framework, they indeed are the first steps taken to dismantle the secular-republican 
order and to replace it with a Şeriat order. Soysal considered the lifting of the ban 
as the sign of the defeat of the republican order on the face of the threat of the 
Şeriat, and argued that the results of such a defeat will be horrifying*^*. An
Hürriyet, January 30, 1997.
' ’^’See his article "Oturan Kızlar" (Sitting Girls), Hürriyet, January 31, 1997.
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interesting statement came from Gencay Gürün, an independent member of 
parliament. She said that she viewed the debate over the türban as an effort to 
divide the country, as a sign of separatism.*^’ On February 15, 1997 The Women's 
March Against the Şeriat, a protest movement organized by the Association of 
Contemporary Lawyers(Çağdaş Hukukçular Demeği) took place in which slogans 
were voiced against turban as well as Islamic groups. This exacerbated the 
polarized debate between secular and Islamist groups.
There are more moderate figures within the secular group. One such person 
is Taha Akyol, a columnist in Milliyet who has argued that there is need for mutual 
liberalization and democratization in the secular-lslamist polarity in Turkey. 
According to him, both groups should get rid of their radicalism. The seculars 
should give up their wish for the disappearance of religion from all spheres of life 
except the realm of individual conscience, and should accept the demand for 
religious freedom in the public sphere. The Islamists, on the other hand, should 
give up the idea of a state order based on religious law.*^ ® Another figure in this 
trend is Gülay Göktürk, a columnist in Yeni Yüzyıl. She has strongly criticized the 
view that turban should be prohibited from the public realm because it is the 
symbol of a particular ideology which is the main argument put forward by radical 
secularists in Txirkey who claim that they are not against the veiling of women in 
the private. Göktürk asserted that this should be the reeison for allowing the turban, 
because if turban is a symbol of a certain ideological and political identity, the ban
''^Milliyet, February 11, 1997.
See his "Islam ve Laiklik" (Islam and Secularism), Milliyet, February 16, 1997.
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over it is an attack on a basic freedom which is more serious than being prevented 
from dressing as one wishes/^*
The Islamists and the veiled women themselves contextualize the issue 
with reference to frindamental human rights and freedoms view the ban as a 
violation of human rights. Setting aside the radicals among them, in general they 
rejected the attack that they symbolize a desire to dismantle the republican order 
and to replace it with a Şeriat order. They argued that wearing turban was a 
requirement of their religious faith which in turn was an inseparable aspect of their 
identity and that in a secular state everybody should have had the right to religious 
freedom.
'See her "Refah Gider Tiirban Kalır",ye/u Yüzyıl, February 6, 1997.
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CONCLUSION
What can be extrapolated from the debate on turban is that the turban affair 
is a specific case where we can observe the weaknesses of the modem notion of 
citizenship together with its main pillars as the public/private distinction, the 
notion of political equality in the form of equality before the law, and negative 
freedom which leaves the citizens free in the private domain. This weakness of the 
modem notion of citizenship has become more visible with the contemporary 
process of globalization since the latter has paradoxically led to tbe shattering of 
the homogenous cultures of the nation-states system and to the emergence of local 
identities. Different ethnic and cultural groups within the nation-states have left the 
latter face to face with what Anne Phillips has called ‘the problems associated with 
equality in the context of difference’. Tmkey is not an exception to this global 
trend. A specific case where one observes the centrality of these problems is turban 
affair in Turkey.
The protest of the turbaned women was a serious challenge. These women 
wanted to have university education and to become civil servants with their heads 
covered with turban. They in theory have the right to do all these things, because 
they are citizenship rights and, in that respect equal with everybody else in the 
public realm. But they could not exercise their right in question because their 
head-dress symbolizes an aspect of their identity that should have been located in 
the private. This illustrates the weakness of the conception of equality of the
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liberal democratic tradition that views equality as sameness and adapts an abstract 
universalist definition of the public, opposed to a domain of the private seen as the 
realm of particularity and difference. The result has been a putatively 
homogeneous public. It is within this public sphere that citizenship is defined in 
liberal tradition. The rise of Islamic identity in general, and the turban affair in 
particular in Turkey showed that the abstract notion of citizenship fell short of 
being able to respond to the demands of particular identities, it obscured the 
representation of these identities, and thereby led to a crisis of participation in 
liberal democratic regimes. The turbaned women in Turkey wanted to be present 
in public spaces with their turbans; they demanded to be recognized publicly with 
their turban.
This challenge of the turbaned women was usually viewed by the secular 
circles as a problem that could have fiustrated the consolidation of democracy in 
Turkey. However, the challenge in question might also be viewed as a possibility 
of a "democratic disclosure"^“  and this essay is optimistic about such a possibility. 
This disclosure, however, requires a change in the way we conceive democracy 
which in turn can be realized through certain strategies and commitment to certain 
normative principles. The major strategy is the revitalization of the public sphere 
in the form of a new mode of articulation between the public and the private. This 
task of reviving the public sphere in turn requires a broader definition of the realm 
of politics. In that way, the public sphere and therefore the realm of politics will be 
opened up to differences, to a maximum pluralism. In other words, it will not be
Keyman, “Kemalism, Modenite, Gelenek”, 98.
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excluding the particularities of the different conceptions of good life which are to a 
very great extent shaped by such aspects of one's identity as gender, race, religious 
beliefs, ethnic affiliations, which have traditionally been conceptualized as private
concerns.
In a reformulation of the relationship between the public and private 
spheres, this broadened conception of the public realm asserts, at the same time, 
that the individual will not be sacrificed to the citizen. In other words, “the 
plurality of forms of identities through which we are constituted and which 
correspond to our insertion in a variety of social relations, as well as their tension, 
should be legitimized"*“ .
This mode of articulation between the public and the private, in its turn 
requires a commitment to certain normative principles. One such principle is the 
development of the notion of 'relational identity'. The recognition of the multi­
dimensionality of the identity and its relation to 'the other' contributes to the 
reconstruction of the public sphere around a dialogue among different identities*“ . 
Then, democracy which can meet the demands of a plmal society is the one which 
regulates the relations among different identity positions. This perspective implies 
that democracy should be thought of as a continuous process rather than as an end 
point or as a definition of a certain system*^ .^ There is no end point to the process 
of democratization. Such conception of democracy as a continuous process is
' ”  Mouffe "Preface: Democratic Politics Today", 5. 
Keyman, "Nasil Bir Liberal Demokrasi", 102. 
Ibid., 105.
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possible only if the dialogical or relational character of identity is recognized. In 
addition to this, such a conception of democracy requires a non-essentialist 
framework which suggest that all identities are forms of identifícations and are 
necessarily precarious and imstable^“ . This precariousness of identities makes 
democracy an endless process. As was mentioned above, an identity can develop 
through its relation to the 'other'. The recognition of the relational character of 
identity brings with it another normative principle: a political culture based upon 
the principle of responsibility toward the other
A second normative principle is a new conception of political community; 
more specifically, a shift away fi*om stressing commonality or the existence of a 
substantive common good at the expense of plurality and respect for differences. It 
is not possible to envisage a politics fi-om which antagonism, division, and conflict 
would have disappeared. This is the principle of "agonism"*^* which requires the 
acknowledgment or recognition of the relationship between identity and 
difference. The idea of the common good should be viewed as specifying, in 
Wittgenstein's term, a "grammar of conduct" that coincides with the loyalty to the 
constitutive ethico-political principles of modem democracy: liberty and equality 
for all’^ ’. This perspective, envisages citizenship as a form of political identity that 
is created through allegiance to a set of rules and practices, more specifically to the 
political principles of modem democracy -i.e. liberty and equality for all. In this
Mouife "Preface: Democratic Politics Today", 10.
Keyman, "Nasil Bir Liberal Demokrasi", 106.
Ibid., 101.
Chantal Mouffe, "Citizenship and Political Identity", October, Summer 1992, no. 61, 30.
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perspective, a citizen is not someone who is the passive receiver of rights and who 
enjoys the protection of the law. It is a common identity of persons who might be 
engaging in many different communities and who have different conceptions of 
good, but who accept submission to certain authoritative rules of conduct. "Those 
rules are not instruments for achieving a common purpose -since the idea of a 
substantive common good heis been discarded- but conditions that individuals must 
observe in choosing and pursuing purposes of their own”*'“ . They only provide a 
framework of common practices to guide political activities of the citizens. So, 
they do not postulate the existence of a substantive common good, but nevertheless 
they imply the idea of commonality, an ethico-political bond that creates a linkage 
among the participants in the association.
At this point, Mouffe’s account of Michael Oakeshott’s reflections on civil 
association in On Human Conduct can be very illuminating*‘*\ In her account 
Mouffe focuses on Oakeshott’s differentiation between two alternative 
interpretations of the modem state: universitas and societas.
Universitas indicates an engagement in an enterprise to pursue a common 
purpose or to promote a common interest. Contrary to that model of association of 
agents engaged in a common enterprise, defined by a purpose, societas designates 
a formal relationship in terms of mies , not a substantive relation in terms of 
common action. As Oaekeshott states
Ibid., 31.
Chantal Mouffe, "Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community" in C. Mouffe ed. 
Dimensions o f Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, ( London, New York: 
Verso, 1992), 232-235.
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The idea societas is that of agents who, by choice or circumstance, are 
related to one another so as to compose an identifiable association of a 
certain sort. The tie which joins them... is not that of an engagement in an 
enterprise to pursue a common substantive purpose or to promote a common 
interest, but that of loyalty to one another^“*^.
It is not a mode of relation, therefore, in terms of common action but a 
relation in which participants are related to one another in the acknowledgment of 
the authority of certain conditions of acting. To belong to the political community 
-societas- what is required is that we accept a specific language of civil 
intercourse. Oakeshott calls this res publica. Those rules prescribe norms of 
conduct to be subscribed to in seeking self-chosen satisfactions and in performing 
self-chosen actions.
To recover citizenship as a strong form of political identification requires 
our loyalty to the res publica, to the political principles of modem democracy and 
the commitment to defend its key institutions. 'Equality and liberty for all' is the 
central political principle of modem liberal democracy. "The conditions to be 
subscribed to and taken into account in acting are to be understood as the exigency 
of treating the others as fi'ee and equal persons"*'' .^ The loyalty to the central 
political principle of liberty and equality for all is a necessary condition to have a 
plural society by which we mean a revitalized public sphere through the 
participation of the maximum of the plmality of identities pertaining to culture, 
religion, morality, ethnicity, gender, and class.
Quoted in ibid, 232. 
Ibid., 236.
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These strategies and normative principles make it possible to think of the 
possibilities of a democratic vision of state/society relations in Turkey. When 
viewed in the light of these points, that is on the condition that there is 
commitment to them, the content of the turban affair in Turkey changes 
dramatically and turns into a possibility of a democratic opening. The radical 
secular circles can help strengthen this possibility by leaving their desire to confine 
religion to the domain of individual conscience, and by accepting that turban is a 
matter of social actors' self-understanding and thereby recognizing the need for a 
new mode of articulation between the public and the private. Wearing a turban is a 
way of saying "I want to be what I am, and I am proud of it", it is an inseparable 
aspect of these women's identities. When looked at fi-om the perspective of the 
social actors’ self-understanding, it becomes hard to treat the case as a matter of 
individual conscience The radicals among the Islamists, on the other side, can 
enhance this process of democratic opening by abandoning the idea of a state order 
n the basis of Islamic principles which would make the vtil compulsory for all 
women in the country which would be in contradiction with the right to treat 
certain aspects of life -such as religion- as private.
It seems inevitable to ask at this point the question that what happens if the 
radical Islamists come to power and replace the existing order in Turkey with a 
religious order. The answer to this question is that to defend the widest possible 
pluralism does not mean to claim that all differences can or should be accepted. 
Some criteria must exist to decide what is admissible and not admissible. Perhaps 
the most adequate criterion can be found in the notion of 'agonism' which means
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the coexistence of differences, different identities under the condition that none of 
the aims at the destruction or the elimination of any other.
Another criterion may be Amy Gutmann's distinction between toleration 
and respect: "not every aspect of cultural diversity is worthy of respect. Some 
differences -racism, anti-Semitism, and religious fundamentalism- are obvious 
examples- ought not be res/)ected, even if expressions of these views must be 
tolerated"'^ “^ . Thus, at the level of expression they are admissible, but when it 
comes to taking the form of action they are not admissible. So, Gutman's 
distinction is also on the same line with the principle of agonism; what is not 
admissible according to Gutman's criterion is differences that are aiming at the 
destruction or even elimination of other differences. At this point the importance 
of defending the key institutions of liberal democracy such as constitutional 
govermnent and rule of law becomes even more clear. Because, it is only through 
these institutions that the criteria for what is admissible and not, and the 
possibility of the coexistence of differences make sense.
Consequently, what the turban affair illustrates is that unless the relational 
character of identity (the fact that it is only through our relations with others that 
we construct our own identities) is recognized, and unless agonism is accepted as 
the organizing principle of the social and political life, it will not be possible to 
overcome the issues stemming from the existence of different identities within 
nation-states. For istance, there are, and will always be, differences among the 
individuals with regard to the ways they prefer to live their religion. The important 
thing is the coexistence of such differences without aiming at the destruction of the
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others and their encouragement in ways that will lead to their development as 
actors in the public deliberation of political issues.
144 Gutmann, "Introduction", 21.
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